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I 
VERTICAL  INTEGRATION  IN  AGRICULTURE 
AND  OTHER  INDUSTRIES. 
l  The  use  of the  term  "vertical integration" 
What  is vertical integration?  In the early stages of 
the  work  the experts  concerned with  this  study spent  many 
hours  discussing  what  was  the  most  appropriate definition 
of this expression.  In the  process  some  clarification of 
thoughts  on  the  subject was  achieved,  though unanimity of 
viewpoint  on  the best definition of vertical integration 
was  lacking.  In particular the  author  of the report on 
the  situation in the  Netherlands  preferred to regard 
participation by  farmers  (in  joint ventures)  as  extending 
to  all activities of co-operatives  in which  farmers  own 
shares  as  members  of the  co-operatives,  a  very much  wider 
interpretation than  was  adopted by  the other experts.  In 
this report vertical integration is used  in  a  loose  sense 
to cover  all harmonisation between  successive  stages of the 
production/marketing/processing/ distribution/ retailing 
chain,  which  is brought  about by  internal or  administrative 
action  as  opposed  to external economic  forces,  particularly 
market  prices.  By  this definition contracting is included 
as  one  of  the  arrangements  for  achieving vertical integration. 
The  text makes  it clear when it is intended to refer to 
complete  integration under  one  ownership,  the  more  restricted 
sense  in which  the  term is sometimes  used. 
The  processes  of vertical integration,  which  so  many 
farmers  appear  to believe  influence only themselves,  are 
everyday occurrences  in other  types  of production or 
commercial  activity.  It is important at the outset to 
establish this very  simple  point.  In all  indu~tries and 
trades  decisions  have  to be  made  directly related to these subjects.  Farmers  often give  the  impression that the 
impact  of vertical integration is of peculiar significance 
to  themselves,  that this  phenomenon  was  contrived by  some 
malevolent deity specifically to plague  them.  Nothing 
could be  further  from  the  truth. 
Few  discussions  on  issues  of policy in  any  form of 
economic  activity can occur without vertical integration 
becoming  one  of the  key  subjects.  This  statement may 
appear  surprising to  many  industrialists  who  do  not 
normally  employ this  term.  But  whether  or not the 
expression "vertical integration" is used,  in fact 
discussions  on  a  wide  range  of business  subjects  are 
concerned with  integration.  Some  of the  main  policy 
issues  discussed by businessmen,  whether  in  formal  meetings 
in the  Board  room  of large corporations or in casual 
discussions  in small  family businesses,  are  directly com-
parable  to  the vertical  integration issues  affecting 
agriculture  which  are  discussed  in this  study. 
2  Vertical  integration outside  agriculture. 
It might  be  useful  to mention  a  few  examples  of 
problems  of vertical integration outside agriculture. 
A manufacturing  industry,  like  the  motor  car  industry, 
has  to obtain supplies,  some  in the  form  of raw materials, 
but mostly manufactured components,  and  assemble  and 
manufacture  them before  they are  available  on  the  market. 
Any  manufacturer  has  to be  concerned,  of course,  with  the 
cost of his  purchased  inputs,  but he  also has  to  decide 
how  he  is to obtain  them  - on  contract,  by  long-term 
friendly  arrangements  with  suppliers  designed  to  promote 
preference  in times  of shortage,  by  "shopping  around"  in the 
market,  or  - to  go  to  the  other  extreme  - by ownership of 
the  source  of supply.  When  considering,  for  example, 
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how  to obtain clocks  for  his cars  a  manufacturer  would 
have  to  take  into consideration which  source  of supply, 
whether  owned  or not,  would  in the  long-term be  cheapest, 
most  dependable  and  most  likely to provide  the  advanced 
designs  that are required.  He  would  have  to  take  into 
account his  own  managerial  and  financial resources.  As 
a  clock maker  he  would  become  a  potential supplier to his 
competitors;  would  this be  desirable?  How  would  he  be 
able  to obtain supplies if there  was  an  industrial dispute 
in his  integrated supplier?  In the case of components 
received  from  an  integrated source  how  is it possible to 
be  sure  that the cost,  quality,  etc.  are  in fact  as 
attractive  as  might  be  available  as  a  result of bargainin0 
with other  suppliers?  Downstream  integration in the 
direction of marketing  presents  similar problems. 
Manufacturers  have  to  ask  themselves  questions  such  as: 
are  we  to  own  our outlets,  to contract with  them,  to 
attempt  to  force  independent outlets  to  act exclusively 
for  ourselves,  or  to sell to all possible customers?  The 
problems  of  an  organisation in  a  service industry,  a 
restaurant or  a  garage,  are  of  a  similar kind.  Limiting 
ourselves  to considering only supply  problems,  a  restaurant 
or  a  chain of restaurants,  in deciding  how  to obtain 
vegetables,  might  have  to choose  between  owning its own 
source  of supply,  contracting with  a  wholesaler,  or buying 
day  to  day  at the markets.  A  garage,  dealing primarily 
with  high capital  investment products,  such  as  petrol, 
tyres,  cars,  etc.  is less likely to get involved in 
ownership  integration,  but supply contracts  and ·their 
terms  and  conditions  may  well  be  important. 
Integration through outright ownership of one  of 
the  adjacent  links  in the chain clearly presents  the 
integrator with  financial  and  managerial  problems  whatever 
industry is in question.  The  type  of integration which 
is much  more  common,  close  working relationships  leading to  the  adoption of the role of traditional supplier  and 
long-term customer,  also  involves  some  difficulties.  One 
clear  advantage  is provided if the  supplier knows  intimately 
about  the  purchaser's requirements.  He  can  then  adapt his 
production procedures  to  these requirements.  As  a  result 
unit costs  may  be  lower  and  selling costs reduced.  Most 
firms  try to build up  one  or more  relationships of this 
kind  and  attempt  to obviate  the  main  disadvantage  - excessive 
mutual  interdependence  - by restricting the  amount  of their 
production which  is  disposed of in this  way. 
That  there  are  economic  benefits to be  obtained 
through  integration  (vertical or horizontal)  is undeniable. 
One  need  only study  any  prospectus  for  a  corporate merger 
to realise  how  important  a  part this plays  in  the  policies 
of acquisitive companies.  As  has  already been  indicated, 
with vertical integration selling costs  can be  reduced, 
and  under  full  ownership eliminated.  Given  exact prior 
knowledge  of the  requirements  of the  downstream  customer 
or  the  supply position of the  upstream link,  economies 
are  likely to be  obtained in production runs  and  stocks 
can be  kept at a  minimum.  Through  horizontal  integration, 
which  in agriculture  may  be  achieved by cooperation,  it 
may  be  possible to  make  savings  in research  and  development 
expenditure. 
3  The  objectives of vertical integration 
Before  turning  to  the  special position of agriculture 
it might  be useful  to  summarise  what  are  the  main  motives 
which  influence  firms  to  integrate vertically.  These 
motives  can be  discussed under  the  following  headings. 
(i)  Lower  operating costs.  Any  of the  main  items 
of  a  business's costs can theoretically be 
reduced  through vertical integration.  Savings 
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can be  made  on  purchasing  through  more  exact 
knowledge  of future  requirements,  on  stocks 
which  may  be  kept  at  a  lower  level,  on 
manufacturing  through  specialisation and 
longer  production runs,  and  on  selling,  costs 
of which  can be  reduced  to nil in  a  fully 
integrated system. 
very significant. 
These  savings  can be 
(ii)  Reduction  in market risks.  Integration 
arrangements  can have  important  implications 
on  risk-bearing  and  risk-sharing over  market 
prices.  Through  contracts at pre-determined 
prices both buyer  and  seller can  hedge  their 
market risk.  Even  forward contracts without 
fixed prices can  introduce  an  element  of risk 
hedging.  There  may  be  a  loss  to set against 
the benefit of this operation.  A  company 
that sells all its production  to  one  customer 
at  a  fixed  price is not likely to obtain  as 
large  a  return as  another  who  plays  the market, 
dealing with  a  large number  of customers.  On 
the  other hand  the  latter is, of course,  at 
greater risk. 
(iii)  Rapid  exchange  of technical  knowledge.  An 
integrated company  enjoying  long-term 
relationships  with other companies  up  or  down  the 
chain is more  likely to be  prepared to  provide 
technical  assistance  and  disclose  freely what 
are its own  technical  problems.  With 
ownership  integration an  even  freer  exchange 
of information can be  obtained. (iv)  Optimal  use  of limited managerial resources. 
Well  developed  management  experience  in one 
link in  the chain can be  rapidly used  in  an 
anterior or  posterior link.  Given  the 
existence of talented management  which  is 
not being fully ut'ilised,  a  company can 
deploy this talent either horizontally or 
vertically to its own  benefit  and  that of 
the  newly  integrated organisation. 
(v)  Improving  market  position.  A  company 
selling in  a  market  dominated by  a  few  large 
buyers  and  lacking competition might  decide 
that the best way  to  improve  its market 
position would  be  to integrate  forwards  and 
so  disturb  this oligopsonistic market. 
(vi)  Investing company  funds.  A  company  with 
surplus  funds  arising  from  profits or  as 
a  result of sales of assets  has  to  decide 
where  to invest them.  If the  funds  are 
left in cash or readily marketable  securities 
the  company itself becomes  vulnerable  to  a 
take-over.  The  alternatives  for  investment 
are  usually seen  as  horizontal integration, 
vertical integration,  or  diversification 
into  a  new  field.  Even  without  any 
integration arrangements  a  company often 
knows  a  lot about its suppliers  and  customers, 
and  frequently  the company's  directors believe 
that superior  management  can be  used  to benefit 
an  adjacent link,  which  therefore becomes  a 
natural target for  ownership  integration. 
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4  Factors  peculiar to  agriculture. 
These  factors  influencing vertical integration are 
all important  to  agriculture,  but there  are  a  number  of 
additional  influences  which  are  more  or less peculiar to 
agriculture.  The  principal ones  are noted below. 
(i)  It can be  argued that farmers  and their 
organisations  are  prompted  to  move  towards 
vertical integration because of the 
difficulty of  any  large-scale horizontal 
organisat~on of agriculture,  especially 
(ii) 
on  a  full  ownership basis.  In  so  far  as 
supply control can be  seen  as  an  alternative 
to vertical integration  as  a  solution to 
agriculture's  income  problems,  it must  be 
recognised that few  agricultural products 
lend  themselves  to efficient supply control 
on  a  large  scale. 
For  many  agricultural products it is 
difficult, and  in  some  cases it is 
impossible,  to create effective brand 
identification,  and  in this  way  to exercise 
control over  selling prices.  The  ever-
increasing market  in Western  Europe  for 
packaged  foods  is beginning  to facilitate 
brand identification,  leading  to better 
possibilities of control  over  selling prices. 
Nevertheless  some  agricultural products, 
including butter  and cheese,  wine,  and  some 
fruits,  which  are  produced  in limited and 
defined  areas,  can benefit  from brand 
identification.  In future  the  number  of 
products  which  can be  differentiated in 
their marketing  may  well  increase. (iii)  Problems  of capital  and credit.  The 
difficult financing  problems  of agriculture, 
which  have  led governments  of  some  countries 
to offer special  terms  for  agricultural 
lending  and create special banking  institutions, 
can be  very relevant to vertical integration 
and  the use  of contracts.  Companies  selling 
to or buying  from  farmers,  which  may  have 
easier access  to capital  and credit,  can 
offer financing  facilities  as  part of  an 
inducement  to the  making  of integration 
arrangements. 
(iv)  Just as it is right to  take  account of the 
personal motivations  of business  men  in 
corporate  integration policies,  so  one  must 
also reckon  with  the  special motivations 
existing  among  leading  members  of farmers' 
organisations,  notably co-operatives,  which 
are  likely to play  a  part in promoting,  or 
inhibiting,  integration arrangements.  Both 
managers  and  directors  of agricultural co-
operatives  possess  personal  ambitions  which 
are relevant to  the  part played in vertical 
integration by  these organisations.  It is 
hardly surprising that they  are  generally 
antagonistic  to  schemes  sponsored by non-
agricultural interests which  they  tend  to 
regard  as  threats to their  own  well-being. 
(v)  Agriculture operates in  a  somewhat  different 
social environment  from  that of other 
activities.  The  wish  to remain  independent, 
often passionately expressed,  the  sensitivity 
to  any  loss  of status,  and  the consequent 
antagonism  to vertical integration,  exist 
elsewhere,  but  they  are  probably strongest 
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tn agriculture.  Here  one  can distinguish 
between  the  responses  of the  more  prosperous 
farmers,  who  are  more  inclined in the  face 
of vertical integration to opt for collective 
action,  and  the  poorer  farmers  who  may  be 
more  inclined to  see contracts  as  a  means 
of improving  their economic  position.  But, 
generally speaking,  most  farmers  are still 
suspicious  of vertical integration. 
(vi)  Despite  developments  in factory  farming 
agriculture has still not become  ~ully 
comparable  to  a  manufacturing  industry. 
It is probably less easy,  at least in some 
countries,  for  a  farmer  to be  sure of the 
quality of his  supplies,  (e.g.  of calves  and 
piglets),  than it is for  a  manufacturer 
ordering his  components.  Despite  specialisation 
quality control still presents  problems  in 
agriculture,  and  this  influences  the  form 
and  extent of contracts in agriculture. 
(vii)  By  its very nature  farming  has  a  special 
problem in receiving,  absorbing  and  adopting 
technical  knowledge  as  rapidly as  possible. 
One  of  the  more  important  arguments  for 
vertical integration is that it can  lead 
to  an  increase in the  speed with  which 
technical  knowledge  is  adopted  to the benefit 
of agriculture  and its customers.  Failing 
vertical integration farmers  may  adopt 
technical  innovations  so  slowly that when 
put  into practice  they may  be  out of date 
compared  with  new  developments.  By 
contrast companies  with  advanced  R  & D departments,  such  as  Birds  Eye  in Britain, 
can  induce rapid technical  advances  with 
farmers  contracting with  them. 
(viii)  Account  must  be  taken of the  non-economic 
factors  influencing land prices.  The 
high cost of land  and  the relatively low 
return on it,  has  been  a  powerful  cause 
of the  development  of intensive  farming. 
These  products  are  most  suitable to 
marketing  systems  characterised by vertical 
integration. 
(ix)  In recent years  perhaps  the  two  most 
important  influences  on  agriculture  throughout 
the  Community  have  been  the  substitution 
of capital  for  labour  and  the  growth  of 
specialisation of production.  These 
have  made  more  attractive the risk-sharing 
possibilities offered by vertical integration 
which  are  discussed later in this report. 
(x)  In many  parts of Western  Europe  agriculture 
has  emerged  only recently from  a  state in 
which  subsistence  was  a  significant element 
in the  farming  economy.  Large-scale 
marketing  of agricultural products  is  a 
comparatively new  problem  for  most  farmers. 
(xi)  Similarly,  it is only fairly recently that 
agriculture  has  been in  a  position to be 
able  to control quality and  forecast 
quantities,  both pre-requisites for contract 
production  and  the  development  of an efficient 
marketing  system. 
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(xii)  The  farm  products  for  which  demand  has 
increased most rapidly in recent years, 
such  as  broilers  and veal calves,  have 
been essentially new  products,  involving 
the  development  of new  production  and 
marketing  techniques. 
(xiii)  The  quality of rural education has  tended 
to  lag behind what is available elsewhere. 
A certain level of education is required 
before  farmers  can effectively take part 
in contracts.  This  level has,  at least 
until recently,  not been generally available 
in Western  Europe.  There  are,  of course, 
very big differences  in the  level of 
technical  ability in agriculture in the 
EEC  countries.  But  at least it is clear 
that not all farmers  are competent to take 
part in integration arrangements. 
(xiv)  Changes  in the  scope  and  structure of the 
agricultural  input industries  (producers 
of feed,  breeding  stock,  farm buildings, 
etc.)  are relevant to vertical integration 
and contracting,  particularly those  affecting 
the  compound  feed  industry,  which  has  been 
closely concerned in these  developments. 
These  changes,  notably  the  tendency  towards 
concentration,  are  discussed in  a  later 
chapter. 
(xv)  Likewise,  there  have  been very rapid 
changes  in  the  demand  for  food  associated 
with rising living standards,  use  of leisure, 
different techniques  of  food  production, 
changes  in retailing,  etc.,  which  are described in greater detail later in this 
report.  Changes  in the  demands  of the 
food  industries  on  agriculture have  been 
an  important influence  on  the  growth  of 
vertical integration,  these changes  being 
exerted either directly,  or  (more  commonly) 
via organisations  engaged  in the first stage 
of transformation of  farm  products  -
slaughterhouses,  packing  stations,  grading 
plants,  etc. 
The  above  features  - and  there  are  doubtless  others  -
distinguish agriculture  from  other  forms  of economic  activity 
in the  development of vertical integration.  Some  tend to 
promote it and  others  inhibit it.  It is important to 
appreciate  these  differences between  agriculture  and  other 
industries  in order  to understand  the  forces  behind  the 
integration process,  but it is equally important  to realise 
that the basic pressures  leading  to integration - the  need 
to  secure  supplies  of inputs,  the  need  to obtain dependable 
outlets  for  products,  (both being related to risk bearing) 
and  the  need to  find  suitable opportunities  for  investing 
surplus  funds  apply to all business  activity.  The  main 
reason  why  vertical  integration applied  to agriculture is 
currently such  an  important  topic is because  standards  of 
business  management,  commonly  employed  in other industries, 
have  only recently begun  to be  generally used in agriculture, 
a  point that will be  developed  in the  next chapter. 
13 14 
II 
DEVELOPMENTS  IN  AGRICULTURE  AND  THE  FOOD  AND 
AGRICULTURAL  INDUSTRIES  RELEVANT  TO  INTEGRATION. 
1.  Background  to  the  present situation 
Nowadays  most  people  take  for  granted  a  rapid pace  of 
change  in economic  life.  Developments  in new  industrial 
techniques,  the continual  introduction of new  consumer  goods, 
and  changes  in corporate  structure  (well-known companies 
with  household  names  being  taken over  through mergers)  are 
now  accepted  as  features  of the  world  we  live in.  But 
this  acceptance  of change,  and  expectation of future  change, 
is relatively new.  Profound  and  rapid changes  applied  to 
agriculture  are especially novel.  About  a  hundred years 
ago  farmers  in Western  Europe  had little reason  to expect 
any considerable change  in the  techniques  of their trade 
or  in their way  of life.  In the  1870's  an  intelligent 
farmer  might have  foreseen  a  range  of technical  developments, 
the  application of power  to agriculture,  for  example  steam 
engines  used  for  threshing,  and  the possibilities implied 
by  the  development  of machinery  for  harvesting.  In most 
respects,  however,  agricultural practices  at that time  were 
not radically different from  those  used  one  or even  two 
hundred years  previously.  The  agricultural historian 
could  point to  some  important changes  that took  place  in 
farming  prior  to  1870,  but in most respects  farming 
practice~ then  were  set in  an  accepted  frame.  There  was 
still a  vast  amount  of hand  work  in  farming,  both in livestock 
and  arable  production  - milking by hand,  shifting  farmyard 
manure  without mechanical  aids,  scything,  weeding,  and  so 
on.  Lacking  the  development  of the  agricultural  input 
industries,  notably compound  feeds,  fertilisers  and 
herbicides  and  p. esticides,  the  farmer  was  largely self-
reliant in respect of inputs.  Typically he  used his  own seed corn kept back  from  the  previous year,  fertilised his 
fields  with  manure  produced by his  own  stock,  and  fed his 
animals  on  hay,  kale,  beet,  and other products  which  he 
had  grown  and  stored himself.  A  hundred years  ago  the 
growth of industrial  towns  in Western  Europe  had created 
some  need  for  agricultural marketing,  but subsistence  was 
still an  important part of farming.  Many  farmers  still 
slaughtered their own  livestock,  ground their  own  flour, 
and  made  their own  butter.  This  primitive kind of 
integration was  still rather typical of agriculture  through-
out Western  Europe. 
Modern  agriculture operates  in  an entirely different 
economic  environment.  The  features  of this  new  environment 
most relevant to  the  subject under  discussion are  the 
development  of  the  agricultural  input industries,  the 
growth  of market orientation in farming,  and  increasing 
specialisation and  intensification of farm  production. 
2.  The  farm  input industries. 
In most parts of Western  Europe  agriculture could not 
now  function  without  supplies  drawn  from its supporting 
industries.  Farmers  have  passed back to specialised firms 
the  production of many  of the  inputs  which  previously  they 
made  themselves,  or  otherwise  managed  without.  A  wide 
range  of  farm  inputs  - breedingstock,  seeds,  compound  feeds, 
chemicals,  farm buildings,  etc.  are  now  sold to  farmers  by 
companies  engaged  in the  agricultural  supply industries. 
As  these  companies  have  steadily improved  the quality and 
reliability of their products  the  case  for  farmers 
purchasing  them  has  become  stronger.  In modern  agriculture 
it rarely makes  economic  sense  for  a  farmer  himself even 
to manufacture  the  simplest requirements  like wooden  posts 
for  fencing. 
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Farmers  have  therefore become  very significant buyers 
of  a  large  number  of requirements.  In Britain,  for  example, 
the cost of purchased  animal  feeds  and  fertilisers  alone  is 
higher  than net farming  income;  in 1972  a  total of £865  mn. 
compared  with  £790  mn.  Over  the years  farmers  have  been 
compelled to become  more  sophisticated purchasers,  conscious 
of relative prices  and  the  importance  of credit terms. 
Realisation of the  importance  to  them of  farm  requirements 
has  been  a  major  reason for  the  development  of agricultural 
co-operation.  In  the enlarged Community,  with  the 
exception of Britain and  Ireland,  the requirements  trade 
is  dominated by co-operatives  which  are  also normally 
engaged  in marketing  farm  products.  This  overlap in the 
supply of requirements  and  marketing of produce,  a  feature 
of great relevance  to vertical integration,  extends  to  the 
private  trade.  Companies  engaged  in the  manufacturing of 
compound  feeds  (such  as  Spillers in Britain  and  Sanders  in 
France)  have  also been  drawn  into agricultural marketing. 
Briefly,  the  process  has  consisted of the  feed manufacturer 
offering credit to the  farmer  in order  to get his business, 
contracting over  a  period in pursuit of security of outlet 
and  in order  to  lower  selling and  distribution costs, 
finding itself thereby more  closely involved in the  farmer's 
business,  and  then needing  some  control over  the  finished 
product in order to protect its credit position.  Of  the 
input industries it is mainly  feed  manufacturers  due  to  the 
regularity and  significance of their sales  to  farmers, 
that have  become  involved in integration arrangements. 
But  other  examples  exist of close relationships between 
agricultural  producers  and  suppliers,  such  as  that between 
veal  production  and  manufacturers  of milk replacers  in 
France.  Producers  of breeding  stock  and  farm buildings 
have  also become  involved in vertical integration. 
A  few  years  ago  feed  manufacture  seemed  to be  a  key 
element  in vertical integration in all the countries of the  enlarged  EEC.  Companies  were  contracting actively 
on  sales of feeds  to  farmers  particularly those  producing 
eggs  and broilers.  The  process  seemed  to be  associated 
with  low profit margins  in the  compounding  industry.  It 
appeared  to  some  people  that the  feed  industry was  on  the 
verge  of "taking over11  agriculture.  More  recently, 
however  there has  been  some  reversal  in this  trend as 
companies  have  begun  to  look  more  critically at the rates 
of return earned on  their direct investments  in agriculture 
or  obtained on  the credit extended  to their contracted 
customers.  For  example  in France  Provimi  has  withdrawn 
from  egg  production,  and  in Britain J.  Bibby  and  BOCM-Silcocks 
have  reduced their direct stake in pig breeding.  It seems 
unlikely that there will be  any major  new  upsurge  in vertical 
. integration by  the  input industries,  least of all on  a  full 
ownership basis. 
3.  Market orientation  and  farm  incomes 
The  second point - the  increase in the  market orientation 
of agriculture  - requires little comment.  The  fall  in  the 
proportion of the  working  population in the  EEC  engaged 
in agriculture  (by roughly half since  1958)  combined  with 
the massive  improvement  in agriculture's potential in 
higher yields  per hectare has  reduced  the  subsistence 
element  in agriculture to insignificant proportions. 
This  can be  very simply illustrated.  The  production of 
a  modern  one-man  dairy unit  (with  80  or  90  cows  in milk) 
might  be  about  1,500 litres  a  day.  To  be  economic  a 
commercial  egg  producer unit may  have  to deliver  around 
5,000  eggs  a  day.  Clearly in neither c.ase  can  the  amount 
retained by  the  farmer  for  consumption by himself  and his 
family  amount  to more  than  a  trifling proportion of total 
output. 
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they also become  more  conscious  of what  they obtain for 
their increased production.  When  larger  amounts  of 
produce  are being negotiated,  small  differences  in price 
per quintal  amount  to significant sums.  Farmers  have 
become  better educated in marketing,  more  conscious  of the 
need  to offer produce  attractively and  in graded qualities. 
The  new  market orientation of agriculture is closely 
connected with  the  third point - specialisation  and 
intensification of production.  These  important  tendencies 
can be  seen in varying degrees  throughout  European  agriculture. 
The  more  advanced  is  the  state of  agriculture  the  more  rapid 
is  the  development  of these  trends.  But all over  Europe 
farm  production is gradually moving  into  fewer  and  larger 
hands.  In  future  the  movement  of farmers  off the  land 
may  be  slower,  perhaps  1  per cent to  2  per cent  a  year, 
but it shows  no  sign of stopping.  Concentration of 
production is proceeding faster  than  the  exodus  of farmers 
from  the  land.  In all sectors of  farming  there is evidence 
of large  increases  in output per  man  and  per  farm.  For 
example  in Britain the  average  production of milk  per dairy 
farm  is nowl31,000 litres compared  with 81,000  litres ten 
years  ago.  The  advantages  of specialisation are  becoming 
increasingly  accep~ed by  farmers.  The  mixed  farm,  which 
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until recently has  typified European  agriculture,  is giving 
place  to  specialised units  on  which  farmers  concentrate  on 
one  or  two  main  products. 
4.  Specialisation in farm  production 
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Specialisation is occurring  as  rapidly in livestock 
production  as  in arable  farming,  of which  continuous cereal 
growing  is  a  typical example.  As  technical  improvements 
are  made  in hygiene  control,  housing,  and  livestock feeding, 
the  economic unit for  pig,  poultry,  and  dairy production 
is continually rising,  giving rise to  new  problems,  notably in effluent disposal.  Indeed,  in livestock production 
the  farmer  appears  to be  operating  on  a  moving  staircase 
as  the  economic  unit which  permits  him  to  survive  and  prosper 
is  for  ever  moving  further  away  from his grasp.  In the 
most  intensive  forms  of livestock production,  poultry and 
pigs  - the  so-called "concrete  farming"  - specialisation 
within  the enterprise has  been  common  for  many  years, 
farmers  buying  in day-old chicks  and piglets  for  fattening 
from  specialised units.  For  instance in France  traditional 
farm  production of eggs  now  only constitutes some  25  per 
cent - 30  per cent of deliveries.  Specialisation has 
also  affected the  dairy industry,  many  farmers  selling 
off their calves  and  buying back in-calf heifers  as 
replacements  to their herd.  This  trend is likely to 
continue  in the  future,  particularly as  labour becomes 
in short supply.  Mechanisation will  then become  still 
more  important in both  arable  and  livestock production. 
It will  then become  even more  apparent  than  now  that  a 
certain scale of enterprise is required in order  to 
justify the  necessary investment in machinery.  It is 
likely that in the  near  future  few  farmers  will be  able 
to  justify operating  more  than  two  enterprises  on  their 
farms.  From  arguments  of this kind has  arisen the 
search  for  method~· of encouraging  production co-operation 
such  as  the  GAEC 1 s  in France. 
5.  Consequences  of these  trends 
.:~ 
There  are  three  important consequences  of these 
trends relevant  to vertical integration.  First, 
specialisation and  intensification leads  to higher  output 
per hectare.  This  is likely further  to exacerbate  the 
problems  of orderly disposal  of  some  agricultural products 
in the  EEC,  for  which  self-sufficiency has  already been 
reached or  surpassed.  Secondly,  the  individual  farmer, 
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producing  and  marketing  larger quantities of each 
individual  product,  will require  larger credit facilities 
to  provide  the total capital required in his business. 
He  thus  becomes  more  aware  of the  need  to earn  an  adequate 
return on his  total investment.  Typically,  farmers  are 
more  conscious  of the  interest cost on  actual borrowings, 
since this  has  to be  paid in cash,  than of the  theoretical 
interest required in relation to  their own  investment, 
an exercise still rarely performed by farmers.  The  higher 
the ratio between borrowings  and  farmers•  own  capital,  the 
more  significant become  the prices obtained for  farm 
products.  A  farmer  taking up  commercial credit on  a  large 
scale has  to obtain  a  certain price in order  to cover his 
interest costs.  This  price need not necessarily be  the 
maximum  price available.  With  a  high  level of borrowing 
a  farmer  becomes  more  interested in market hedging  and 
therefore  in contracting  forward  on  his  sales. 
The  third consequence  of specialisation is of great 
significance  to vertical integration.  Farmers  have 
limited  time  and  ability to  make  themselves  experts  in 
many  branches  of agriculture.  It is hard  to keep  track 
of all the  technical  developments  affecting,  for  example, 
pig production,  dairying,  and  cereal  growing.  Indeed 
this difficulty of mastering all the  diverse ramifications 
of agriculture is itself one  of the  causes of specialisation. 
One  of the  most vital aspects  of agricultural  knowledge 
consists  in quality control.  Given  specialisation  a 
farmer  is better able  to  keep  close control  on  the  quality 
of his production,  and  also is able  to be  confident in 
advance  that he  will be  able  to  produce  to specification. 
In  this  way  he  becomes  an  interesting partner in vertical 
integration to  the  food  processing industries.  Finally, 
the  substitution of  speci~.lisation of production  for  mixed 
farming  creates greater potential market risks  for  farmers 
since  their incomes  become  dependent  on returns  from  sales of  fewer  products.  Hence  contracts become  more  welcome 
if they  introduce greater stability of prices  and  revenues. 
6.  Farmers'  income  objectives 
Underlying  much  of the  above  analysis  of the  trends 
in agriculture relevant to vertical integration is the 
income  requirement of farmers.  The  principal reason 
that farmers  adopt  new  techniques,  intensify their production 
and  orientate it towards  known  market outlets is  to  protect 
and  enhance  their net  incomes.  Like  anyone  else  farmers 
want  to  improve  their incomes  and  to  avoid  falling behind 
the rate of increase  in other occupations.  It is 
difficult,  if not impossible,  to generalise  about their 
income  objectives,  but at least it seems  certain that 
many  do  not  attempt  to maximise  incomes  in the  short run. 
Other  factors  play  an  important part.  For  example,  in 
countries  where  the  farming  industry is taxed  on  much  the 
same  basis  as  other occupations,  farmers  may  wish  to  try 
to  minimise  their tax liability.  They  may  therefore be 
inclined to run their  farm businesses  in order  to yield  a 
certain income  and  no  more.  Others  may  be  mainly concerned 
with building up  the capital value  of their enterprises. 
The  possibilities offered by integration arrangements  to 
pre-fix  incomes  and  to mitigate market risks  may  well 
fulfil  an  important,  though  sometimes  unexpressed,  need 
among  farmers.  Some  farmers  are natural speculators, 
but  a  great many  others  are not.  To  them it may  well be 
very attractive to  operate in an  environment in which  both 
costs  and  returns  are  under  as  much  control  as  possible. 
This  is  something  which  forward  contracts  may  help  to 
provide.  Unfortunately very little precise information 
is available  about  the  income  objectives of farmers  in 
the  EEC,  but it is perhaps  significant that in  a  recent 
survey in Britain 84  per  cent of all contracting  farmers 
gave  income  stability as  an  advantage  to be  gained  from 
contracting. 
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7.  The  main  partners  in integration 
Vertical  integration in agriculture being concerned 
with relationships between  the  various  links  in the 
production/marketing/processing chain,  it is important  to 
take  account of the  situation of the  industries  that lie 
on either side of agriculture,  notably  the  farm  input  and 
food  processing industries,  including organisations  engaged 
in grading  and  packing  farm  produce.  Some  analysis is 
required of the  pressures  to which  they  are  responding  and 
the  policies  they are  adopting  towards  agriculture.  As 
this  study is mostly concerned with vertical integration 
downstream  from  agriculture only brief comment  is required 
on  the  input industries  whose  activities in integration 
have  already been mentioned. 
Most  farm  inputs  are bought only intermittently. 
Normally  farmers  buy  seeds,  chemical  sprays  and  fertilisers 
only once  or  twice  a  year.  While  theoretically  a 
fertiliser manufacturer  or  dealer could  attempt  to obtain 
a  customer  or  secure  a  debt by making  a  pluri-annual 
contract or obtaining  a  hold over  the  disposal  of the 
farmer's  produce,  in practice this  does  not normally 
happen.  Sales of these  inputs  and  the  numerous  less 
important  farm requirements  are  made  on  an  ad  hoc  basis. 
Credit may  be  available but it is very rare that  any 
strings  are  attached to it.  In practice  the only inputs 
specifically relevant to vertical integration are  animal 
feeds  and breeding  stock,  though  manufacturers  of farm 
buildings  are  also  sometimes  involved. 
The  activities of the  feed  industry in Western  Europe 
in vertical integration have  already been briefly outlined. 
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Commercial  production of  animal  feeds  is disposed of in 
four  ways.  Traditionally,  farmers  have  bought  feeds 
from  one  or  more  merchants  as  they have  required it at the  price ruling  on  the  day  in question.  Despite  the 
encouragement that this  system provides  to waste  of sales 
effort, it is still the  most  common  method of buying. 
However,  an  alternative method,  the  use  of seasonal 
contracts  at fixed  prices  - often covering  a  six-month 
period  - is becoming  increasingly popular,  particularly 
among  dairy farmers.  Credit may  be  made  available 
through  these contracts,  the credit often being 
extinguished through  the  merchant  purchasing  grain after 
the harvest.  These  contracts have  no  particular 
significance  for vertical integration. 
The  third method  of negotiating purchases  of  animal 
feeds  contains  a  more  direct involvement  in the  farmers' 
end-product  on  the  part of the  feed  industry.  This  has 
developed  for  three  main  reasons.  First, it became 
apparent to both  feed  manufacturers  and  livestock breeders 
(producers  of day-old chicks,  weaner  pigs  and  calves)  that 
they  had  some  identity of interest in that both  wanted  to 
secure  farmer  customers  for  their products  on  advantageous 
terms.  The  two  products  combined  formed  a  very large 
part of the  total costs of  an  intensive  farm enterprise, 
for  which  the risk could be  most easily secured by obtaining 
rights over  the  finished  product.  Secondly,  many  egg 
packing  stations,  broiler plants,  and to  some  extent 
slaughterhouses  for  pigs  and cattle were  interested in 
securing  guaranteed  throughput  for  their businesses.  If 
they were  successful  in contracting with  farmers it became 
an  obvious  next step  to  incorporate  a  feed  supplier into 
the  scheme.  This  could be  done  to  the  advantage  of all 
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parties.  Sometimes  a  relationship is established between 
the  producer  and  the  feed  company;  sometimes  the  feed 
company  deals  with  the  packing station,  the cost of feed 
being  deducted  from  sums  owed  to  the  producer  against 
deliveries.  This  simple  form  of integration is common 
in the  poultry industry.  Its  advantages  are  that feed 
prices  should be  kept  low  as  selling costs  are virtually 
eliminated,  and  the  amount  of administrative  work  for  the 
farmer  is much  reduced.  The  potential disadvantages, 
which  will be  further  commented  on  later in this report, 
are  that the  farmer  may  feel  that he  is not getting the 
quality of feed  which  he  requires  or that the  price is 
wrong;  that he  may  be  locked into  a  situation from  which 
it could be  difficult to escape;  and  that his  area for 
decision making  may  be  greatly reduced. 
The  willingness  of  the  compound  feed  industry to 
participate in these  schemes  is  associated with  the 
competitive environment  which  has  characterised this 
industry recently in Western  Europe.  Most  companies 
have  been  anxious  to obtain secured sales  to  enable  them 
to cut out unnecessary visits by  salesmen  and  to  reduce 
production costs by making  possible  larger runs  of each 
type  of feed.  These  motives  have  also been  at the back 
of ownership  integration in livestock production by  the 
feed  industry - the  fourth  method  of disposing of commercial 
production of  animal  feed.  The  theory behind this 
development,  for  which  cases  can be cited in all  EEC 
countries,  is that manufacture  of feed  can only questionably 
be  regarded  as  an  end  in itself.  If the  product is  looked 
upon  simply  as  a  raw material  for  livestock.production,  it 
is  tempting  for  a  feed  company  to believe that it would 
be  a  wise  policy to  move  one  stage further  forward, 
converting its feed  into livestock or livestock products. 
The  temptation is particularly strong if feed  appears  to be 
in over  supply  and  margins  i~ livestock production are attractive.  Indeed,  a  few  years  ago  there  was  ample 
evidence  that this  was  the  way  in which  the  feed  industry 
might  well  move,  in collaboration with livestock breeders, 
some  of which  had been  acquired by the  feed  industry. 
Undoubtedly this  would  have  involved capital,  managerial 
and  - particularly - marketing  problems  which  the  feed 
industry could only with difficulty have  overcome.  At 
present this  development  seems  to have  come  to  a  halt 
and  even,  as  stated earlier,  to have  reversed itself. 
The  reason  for  this  may  be  primarily because of easier 
conditions  in the  feed  industry.  Even if margins  become 
tighter again it seems  more  likely that companies  in the 
feed  industry would  diversify into the  food  industry 
rather  than  resume  their movement  into ownership  integration 
in~agricultural production. 
8.  Interests  downstream  from  agriculture 
Account  must  also be  taken of the many  changes  that 
have  occurred  downstream  from  agriculture,  that is to  say 
among  agriculture's customers  and  particularly in the 
food  processing industries.  To  do  so  we  must  make  use  of 
generalisations not all of which  can be  applied to all 
buyers  of farm  produce,  least of all in equal  measure. 
These  changes  will be  considered under  three headings  -
in  the  structure of the  industries buying  from  agriculture, 
in their  demands  for  farm  products  and  in the relationships  that 
they wish  to establish with  farmers  and  their organisations. 
It might,  however,  be  appropriate to pause  to enquire 
who  are  in fact agriculture's customers  - to  whom  do  farmers 
sell.  For  some  products  the  answer  to this is simple. 
Most  milk is sold to dairies,  eggs  to packing stations, 
poultry to slaughterhouse/packing stations,  grain  and 
potatoes  to merchants  (occasionally direct to processors), 
beet to  sugar factories.  In each case co-operative 
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organisations  play  an  important role  in most  of the 
countries  of the  enlarged Community.  The  first stage 
marketing  channels  for beef  and veal,  pigs,  and  fruit 
and  vegetables  are  generally more  complex.  For  example, 
cattle are  sold either direct to  the  slaughterhouse-
wholesaler or  to butchers,  or  through  dealers  or  agents. 
In  some  countries  (Britain  and  Ireland)  auctions  are 
still commonly used.  Vegetables  can be  sold direct to 
retailers,  to merchants,  to  packing  stations,  or  to 
canners  or processors.  The  important point is that the 
first stage buyers  of agricultural  produce  do  not normally 
consist of retailers  (an  important exception being  eggs 
in Germany,  with  11self-marketing"direct to  shops  and 
consumers),  and  frequently  are  one  step removed  from  the 
food  processing industries.  Farmers  and their  organisati~ns 
are,  therefore,  at least one  stage,  and  generally  two 
stages,  removed  from  the  demands  of the  consumers. 
While  the  channels  through  which  agricultural 
products  move  are  diverse,  and  sometimes  extended,  the 
pressures  to  which  these  market outlets  are  subject  are 
very similar.  This  is not  surprising since  ultimate~y 
it is consumers  who  dictate  what  is required,  or  at  l~ast 
should dictate provided  the  large  food  organisations 
permit their wishes  to be  realised.  These  wishes  can 
make  some  impact  on  local markets,  but in  the  main  they. 
are  expressed  in .purchases  made  in retail shops  and  the 
type  of retailing favoured  by  consumers.  As  is well 
known,  very considerable  changes  have  occurred in recent 
years  in  the  structure  and  practices of the  food retailing 
trades. 
Here  in particular generalisations  on  a  European 
basis  are  hazardous.  Buying  preferences  vary between 
countries,  and  to  almost  as  great  an extent within countries. Some  of  these  differences between countries  and  regions 
are  noted in Chapter  VI.  For  the present purposes it 
will be  sufficient to  comment briefly on  the  main  trends 
in  food  retailing which  are  applying pressures  relevant to 
integration on  the various  suppliers of food  to retailers. 
In  the first place  some  growth  in concentration in 
retailing is evident in all the  member  countries of the 
Community.  Throughout  Western  Europe  large retail 
organisations/are beginning  to  achieve 
the market  dominance  which  has  been  apparent for  some 
time  in North  America,  and  has  more  recently become 
established also in Britain.  These  large chains  compete 
with  the  smaller traders  through  the  convenience  of offering 
a  wide  range  of foods  under  one  roof,  through  own  brands 
promoted by  the  chain,  and  by price cutting made  possible 
by  aggressive buying  and  a  policy of  low margins  on  high 
throughput.  Secondly,  the  trend towards  self-service 
in retailing,  though  under  some  challenge,  still appears 
to persist.  This  type  of selling particularly favours 
packaged  products,  available in known  weights  and qualities. 
Thirdly,  modern retailing requires  standard branded products 
promoted  through  intensive  advertising,  the relative costs 
of  which  buyers  can  identify,  or  at least think they can 
identify. 
The  growing  size of unit in retailing,1 •  the  form  of 
food  retailing and  the  type  of product required all favour 
the  larger organisations  as  suppliers  to retailers.  The 
1.  During  the  sixties the  number  of supermarkets 
in the  EEC  increased  from  350  to  4,500.  But 
the concentration in food retailing in the  six 
original  member  countries is still far  less  than 
in Britain where  the  five  largest groups  in food 
distribution in Europe  are operating. 
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large companies  engaged  in  food retailing,  and  to  much 
the  same  extent also  the  chains  of independent  food 
retailers,  require  to have  guaranteed supplies  of standard 
products  available  in standard qualities  and quantities, 
and  preferably at prices  which  do  not fluctuate  frequently. 
These  pressures  on  food  processors  are reflected on 
farmers  and  their marketing organisations.  Agriculture 
is now  facing  a  diminishing  number  of outlets with  more 
particular requirements  as  to dependability of supply  and 
more  stringent views  on  quality.  While  off-grade  produce 
can  only be  disposed of with great difficulty,  premiums 
can be  obtained for  the right products  offered on  a  regular 
basis at the right place.  Increasingly processors  are 
attempting  to obtain their supplies  through  methods  other 
than  open market buying,  the  advantages  and  disadvantages 
of which  to  farmers  will be  discussed in later chapters. 
It would be  a  mistake  to imagine  that companies 
engaged  in  food  processing  and  distribution share  common 
policies regarding  securing their supplies.  Several 
examples  of integration can be  given.  For  example,  the 
British Co-operative  Wholesale  Society owns  egg-packing 
stations  (contracting with  farmers)  which  provide  some  of 
the  eggs  for its co-operative members.  In France  Lustucru, 
the  manufacturer of pasta products,  is  linked by exclusive 
contracts  for  supplies  of eggs  from  a  group of farmers. 
The  large British food retailer Sainsbury's obtains part 
of its bacon requirements  from  integrated sources.  But 
Associated British Foods  which  owns  the  supermarket chain 
Fine  Fare  disposed of its poultry  and  feed  subsidiary, 
Allied Farm Feeds. 
9.  Producers  and  their organisations  in the  Community 
No  account of recent developments  in agriculture 
and  the  food  and  agricultural input industries relevant to  the  growth of vertical integration would  be  complete 
without  some  mention  of changes  that have  occurred  among 
farmers  themselves  and  their organisations.  Here  one 
enters  a  difficult area where  generalisations,  most of 
all  on  a  Community basis,  are  liable to be  misleading. 
So  far  as  farmers  themselves  are  concerned  the  following 
three broad categories  are  more  or less valid.  First, 
those  who  run their  farms  as  businesses,  i.e. professionals 
who  could be  expected to be  employed,  if they had  no  farm 
of their own,  as  well  paid managers.  Secondly,  those  with 
average  ability who  are  likely to operate profitably 
provided that their farms  are of  an  economic  size,  soil 
conditions  favourable,  adequate capital available,  etc., 
but who  have  less business  ability than  the first category. 
And  finally,  those  to  whom,  consciously or unconsciously, 
farming  is  a  way  of life rather  than  a  business,  this 
category including  the  traditional peasant  farmers,  most 
part-timers,  and  those  who  are unlikely to be  able  to 
ensure  that the quality of their production meets  the  more 
exacting requirements  now  often needed by market outlets. 
The  number  of farmers  in the first category,  corresponding 
with  those  who  are  likely to be  both most  interested in 
vertical integration arrangements  and  most  qualified to 
take  part in  them,  is increasing,  partly at the  expense 
of  the  number  in the  second category.  The  exodus  of 
people  from  the  land  which  has  occurred  through  the 
Community  since its inception has  largely been of farmers 
in the  third category.  As  a  consequence  the  proportion 
of total agricultural production in the  hands  of  farmers 
able  and willing  to participate in vertical integration 
must  have  substantially increased in recent years. 
Turning  to  the  commercial  organisations  which  farmers 
have  created in order to  serve their interests in buying 
requirements  and  marketing  farm  products,  the  differences 
between  the  member  countries  are considerable,  extending 
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to  legal status,  organisational structure  and  the  proportion 
of trade co-operatively controlled.  There  are,  however, 
certain features  of co-operation which  with  some  exceptions 
are  common  to all the  member  countries.  In relation 
to vertical integration the  most  important  are divisions 
within co-operation caused by religious  or political 
affiliations,  lack of discipline  among  members  over 
dealing exclusively with their co-operative,  and  reluctance 
to treat their organisations  on strict business  lines with 
possible consequences  for  the  standards  of their management. 
These  three characteristics all act  as  impediments  to  the 
proper  functioning  of co-operatives  and  in particular to 
their capacity to participate in vertical integration. 
In recent years  there  have  been  signs  of  improvement  in 
all three.  This is fortunate  since,  setting aside  the 
case  for  the  engagement  in vertical integration by  producers' 
organisations,  there is no  doubt  that agriculture  would 
benefit if co-operatives  were  undivided by religious or 
other differences,  if they could count on  a  disciplined 
membership,  and if their management  were  both commercially 
skilled and  properly remunerated.  These  points  are  taken 
up  again later in this  study  and  particularly in Chapter  VII. 
Finally,  one  should note  the  important differences 
in the role of the  state in relation to  farmers  and  their 
organisations.  With  the exception of Britain,  which 
until recently had virtually no  specific structural policy, 
all the  member  countries  have  introduced measures  of 
structural reform affecting  farmers.  Examples  are  provided 
by expenditure under  the  German  Green  Plan  on resettlement 
and  in France  on  the  SAFER's  and  GAEC's.  There  have  been 
significant differences  in the  extent of state support for 
farmers'  organisations ranging  from  negligible in the 
Netherlands  to the  extensive  aids  provided in France. III 
THE  CASE  FOR  CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHIPS  IN  AGRICULTURAL  MARKETING 
1  The  purpose  of contracts 
Before  turning  to  the  special  problems  of contracting 
in agriculture it is worth re-emphasising  the  theme  expressed 
in the  first chapter,  that the  processes  described in this 
report  are  far  from  unique  to  agriculture.  Goods  are  sold 
on contract in most  industries  and  trades,  and  in many 
cases contracts  are  made  prior to manufacture.  For 
example,  a  retailer buying  goods  against his  anticipated 
sales  over  a  certain period will either place  a  buying 
order  for  immediate  delivery or  make  a  contract with  a 
manufacturer  for  future  delivery,  both being based  on 
specifications or  against  a  sample.  The  retailer will 
be  inclined to place  a  contract for  a  period if alternative 
sources  of supply are uncertain,  if the  price currently 
quoted is attractive,  or if the  purchase  tends  to close 
out this  source  of supply  to competitors.  The  manufacturer 
will be  disposed to  favour  contracting if there  are  few 
alternative outlets available,  if he  considers  the  price 
specially attractive,  if the  product is perishable or has 
limited outlets,  or if the contract contributes  to his 
own  peace  of mind  and  that of his bankers.  Contracting 
forward  on  sales  to  known  buyers  and  on  supplied to  known 
sellers is  a  common  feature  of all business  activity. 
For  obvious  reasons  most contracts  are  made  in 
writing between  the  parties concerned.  The  documents 
can be  in  a  simple  form,  or consist of  a  great many 
clauses.  Some  contracts  may  be based on verbal  agreements. 
In either case contracts  are  likely to be  legally binding. 
Written contracts  have  the  advantage  that there  should be 
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less possibility of misunderstanding  over  the  terms  and 
purpose  of the  agreement,  but even  a  written document 
might not be  legally enforceable if the Courts  decide 
that there  are  legal defects  in the  manner  in which it 
is  drawn  up.  In most countries  in Western  Europe  model 
contracts  for  agricultural marketing have  been established 
for  the  main  products  often at the  initiative of farmers' 
organisations. 
This  report is primarily concerned with marketing 
contracts  which  cover  a  period of  time  and  which  contain 
an  implication of regularity of supply from  one  party to 
another  during  a  season,  and  from  season to season. 
Contracts  of this kind create  a  relationship between  the 
parties concerned  which is lacking in an  individual  forward 
contract for  one  or  a  few  deliveries  such  as  is  common  for 
example  in grain marketing.  Contracts  made  either by 
individual cereal growers,  or by specialised grain groups, 
or by multi-purpose co-operatives  to deliver forward 
certain quantities of grain to specified buyers  at contract 
prices contain many  of the features  important to contract 
marketing  in agriculture that are  discussed later.  For 
instance,  they have  implications  for  the stability of 
markets,  for  quality control  and  the  availability of 
credit.  In  some  cases  they are concluded before  the 
season begins  and  therefore can in themselves  influence 
the  pattern of agricultural production,  but they  are 
unlikely to  involve  an  on-going relationship between 
seller and  purchaser or  imply one  for  the  future. 
The  detailed studies  on  the use  of contracts  in the 
member  countries contain  a  wealth of information  about  the 
use  of contracts  in agriculture in the  individual countries. 
This  part of the  studies is commented  on  further in 
Chapter  VI.  This  chapter is concerned with three closely 
interrelated questions.  Fi~st,  what  are  the  main  features of contracts in agriculture  which  distinguish  them  from 
contracts use.d  elsewhere'?  Secondly,  what benefits can 
producers  expect to obtain  from  them,  and  what  are  the 
potential disadvantages  of contracting?  And  thirdly, 
looking at contracts  from  the other side of the  fence, 
what  are  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of their use 
from  the  point of view of buyers  of agricultural products'? 
2.  Contracts  in Agriculture 
Once  again it is appropriate to reaffirm the 
difficulty of making valid generalisations  about  farmers' 
talents,  dispositions  or  even  intentions.  Experience 
shows  that  a  suggestion that farmers  are  ill-informed 
about market  developments  affecting their products  is 
invariably countered by the  suggestion that there  are 
numerous  producers  who  follow closely market  trends  and 
are  fully  aware  of the best outlets  for  their goods. 
This  is,  of course,  the  case.  Farmers  are usually very 
price conscious,  and  many  are keenly interested in 
marketing.  Nevertheless,the fact remains  that agriculture 
in Western  Europe  is mainly composed of small units,  the 
occupants  of which  normally  do  not have  the  time  or the 
talents for  keeping close  track of day to day changes 
in mar.ket  prices  and  whose  energies  are mostly directed 
towards  production rather  than trading.  At  the very 
least it can be confidently said that very  few  working 
farmers  possess  the  necessary expertise  to cope  on  their 
own  with  marketing  problems,  nor,  in general,  is it 
likely to be either economic  or administratively convenient 
for  processors  (flour millers,  feed manufacturers, 
vegetable canners,  slaughterhouse operators  and  meat 
wholesalers,  and  so  on)  to undertake  the  procurement of 
the  farm  products  they require.  A  marketing  link is 
also  frequently needed in order to perform the  task of 
bulking  supplies  for  buyers  of farm  produce.  There is 
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therefore room  for  an  intermediary to fulfil  a  valuable 
economic  function  which  can be  applied to  the organisation 
of contracting as  well  as  to open  market trading.  This 
intermediary can be  either  a  co-operative or  a  private 
merchant.  Chapter  VII examines  the role of producers' 
organisations in vertical integration arrangements.  For 
the  purposes  of this chapter it will be  sufficient to 
anticipate the broad conclusion of the later chapter  - that 
contracts  passed  through  a  co-operative are  likely to 
involve  fewer  possible conflicts of interest and will 
therefore normally be best for  most  producers. 
There  are,  of course,  exceptions  to this.  Contracts 
between  individual  farmers  and  processors exist in some 
countries  on  a  substantial scale  and often work  satisfactorily. 
Setting aside  the  special position of beet growers 
contracting with  sugar  factories,  they  tend to  take  two 
main  forms.  First,  there  are  numerous  contracts between 
producers  and  local outlets,  for  example  for cattle to 
local butchers with prices  determined  on  the basis of 
notifications at certain markets.  Contract  arrangements 
of this kind  sometimes  persist from  year  to year.  Secondly, 
there  are  the contracts  made  between certain processors  and 
an elite band of producers  who  value  their contract highly, 
and  even to  some  extent identify themselves  with  the 
processor.  A case of this  type  is provided by the  close 
relationship established with its suppliers in Britain by 
the  Unilever  meat  products  company,  Wall's.  Other  examples 
are  provided by contracts  made  by producers  of soft fruits 
with canners  and  preservers. 
While  contracts  made  by individuals exist and  are 
sometimes  mutually satisfactory, it seems  more  likely 
that the  future will lie with  group contracts.  The 
growth  of concentration in retailing described earlier 
will  provide  no  encouragement  for  local contracts  made 
by individual  farmers.  Identification of elite producers with  whom  they prefer  to contract may  well become  less 
important  to  processors  as  the  general  standards of 
technical  performance  improve.  Besides,  by persisting 
with  individual contracts  farmers  would  lose  one  of  the 
potential benefits of group  activity,  horizontal  integration 
leading  to  somewhat better chances  of supply control,  which 
could ultimately lead to  improved bargaining strength. 
This  matter is discussed later in this report  (Chapter VII). 
The  second special characteristic of farming  relevant 
to vertical integration is the  comparative elasticity 
of supply  and  demand  for  agricultural produce.  Demand 
as  is well  known,  is often  inelastic.  Supply elasticities 
vary between products,  but in general  supply response  to 
price  increases  appears  to be rather positive,  whereas 
in the  short run price reductions  may  only encourage 
some  farmers  to increase production,  the dairy farmer 
buying  another  cow  to maintain his  income  and  the  arable 
farmer  trying  to get his  hands  on  some  adjoining  land. 
In this characteristic  supply/demand situation market 
prices,  failing  government  market  support systems,  are 
liable to  fluctuate considerably.  In conditions of price 
uncertainty there is likely to be  more  inducement  for 
both buyers  and sellers to hedge  their positions by 
contracting forward.  The  difficulties that affect 
contracting in unstable  agricultural markets  are  commented 
on  later. 
A  third peculiarity of agriculture lies in its special 
problems  of obtaining capital or credit and  acquiring  and 
mastering  technical  information.  The  former  is recognised 
by most  governments  of countries  in the  enlarged  EEC,  but 
despit~ aid  and relatively generous  prices  for  a  number  of 
the  major  farm  products,  designed  to protect farm  income 
and  improve  the  possibilities of capital  formation by 
retention  from profits,  the  problem remains  acute.  The 
continuing trend towards  intensification of production 
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will  make  any  solution to it more  difficult.  The  spread 
of information  on  technical  developments  can be  assisted 
in  a  number  of ways,  through  adult education programmes, 
by  the  work of government  advisory services,  via co-operation, 
and  through  the  medium  of the  specialised farming  press. 
There  is no  doubt  that there is  a  need  for  technical 
assistance  among  many  farmers,  who  are  therefore likely 
to  welcome  anything  which  makes  a  positive contribution to 
filling this  gap. 
Fourthly,  one  must  take  account of certain characteristics 
of agricultural markets  which  are  of great significance  to 
vertical integration.  Despite efforts made  by governments 
and  producers'  organisations,  backed by market intelligence 
in the  press  and radio,  there is still inadequate  market 
transparency for  most  agricultural  products.  This  introduces 
an  element of uncertainty which  producers  try to mitigate 
through  making contacts  for  the  disposal of their products. 
This  may  be  all the  more  desirable  in view of the  limited 
numbers  of outlets  available  to  farmers.  Agricultural 
marketing  is characterised by relatively few buyers  of 
most  products,  an  oligopsonistic situation.  Finally, 
an  important  feature  of many  agricultural products  is their 
lack of uniformity.  The  grading of farm  products  continues 
to make  progress but the  influence of weather,  the effects 
of diseases,  etc.  place  a  limit to the  possible effectiveness 
of grading  in both  livestock and  arable production. 
3.  The  case  for  contracting:  for  farmers 
What  do  farmers  expect to get from  signing marketing 
contracts,  and  what  are  they likely to get?  There  could 
only be  one  answer  to the  first question;  higher or more 
certain net  incomes,  if not every year at least taking  one 
year  with  another.  Indeed  the expectation of an  improvement 
in the  level  and stability of net  incomes  is the  only sensible purpose  for  making  a  contract.  This  objective could be 
achieved in three  ways:  through better availability or 
lower  prices  for  farm  inputs;  through  lower unit costs of 
production  as  a  result of improved  agricultural practices 
leading  to higher yields or better conversion factors,  or 
by means  of an  increased scale of production  made  possible 
by greater security of outlet;  or  through higher market 
prices  for  the products  over  a  period.  To  an  extent 
which varies between  products possibilities exist for 
obtaining all these benefits  from contracting.  In order 
to  appreciate  how  they may  be  forthcoming it is necessary 
to  examine  the relationship that can be  established through 
contracting  (whether  direct or  through  the  medium  of  a 
co-operative)  between  a  producer  and  a  processor or other 
buyer  of agricultural products,  which itself could be  a 
co-operative organisation.  This  relationship can  take 
many  forms.  The  description which  follows  is  designed 
to  provide  a  typical  example bringing together most  of the 
functions  of contracting. 
In  an  area in which  pig  farming  predominates  a  number 
of producers  join together  to  form  a  group.  Most  of the 
members  are  pig  fatteners but  some  specialise only in 
producing piglets.  The  group  makes  a  contract with  a 
local  slaughterhouse/meat wholesaler to  supply  a  certain 
number  of pigs  per  week.  On  the basis of this  agreement 
the  group contracts with its members  for deliveries which 
are  organised by  the  group.  Transport costs  are  for  the 
account of producers  who  also pay  a  small  levy to  the 
group based  on  the  number  of pigs  delivered.  The  group 
contracts  with  the  producers  of piglets  and  organises 
deliveries between  members.  It also makes  arrangements 
for  the  provision of breeding  stock  from  a  specialist 
organisation outside  the  group.  Members  have  the  option 
to buy  feeds  (or other requirements)  on  their  own  account 
or via the  group,  which  places bulk orders  with  a  local 
37 38 
feed mill.  The  slaughterhouse settles its account with 
the  group  monthly.  Against its delivery  contracts  the 
group  can obtain credit from  the  local bank  which  enables 
it in turn to make  advance  payments  to its members  if required. 
The  group  employs  a  secretary to  deal  with all financial 
and  administrative matters  and  an  advisory officer 
responsible  for  supervising quality of deliveries  and 
advising  members  on  any  production  problems  that they 
may  have.  Premium  prices  are  obtained from  the  slaughter-
house  reflecting the  advantages  to it of regularity of 
supply  and  savings  on  procurement costs.  A  dialogue 
continues between  the  slaughterhouse  and  the  group  which 
is thus  kept  informed of market requirements  and  price 
trends.  The  group  is run by  a  small  unpaid management 
committee  drawn  from  the  members.  There  is  a  quarterly 
meeting  of all members  to  discuss  the  group's  progress. 
What  does  a  contract  scheme  of this  kind offer to 
farmers  who  take  part in it?  First,  on  the  input side 
farmers  can expect  to obtain disinterested advice  on 
production  problems.  Feed  and  other requirements  can 
be  provided via the  group  at prices  which  may  be  lower 
than  those  available  to individual  farmers.  The  group 
can play  a  role in vetting the  quality of the  delivery 
of  these requirements.  Suppliers  may  be  more  anxious 
to maintain  a  good  service,  knowing  that in the  group 
they have  a  valuable  customer.  The  total supply of 
credit obtainable by  members  may  not be  increased,  but 
the  group's  participation in  a  credit scheme  may  lower 
rates. 
Production costs within the  group  may  be  reduced 
in  a  number  of ways.  Each  member  may benefit not only 
from  the  services of the  advisory officer but also  from 
contacts  with  fellow  members  and  from  feed-back  of 
information on quality,  etc.  from  the contracting slaughterhouse. Through  exchange  of information mortality and  feed 
conversion rates  may  be  improved.  Production could 
also benefit from closer control  on  deliveries of batches 
of piglets  and  on  the  quality of feed  ingredients.  Members 
of the  group  are  spared marketing  and requirements  worries 
and  can concentrate their attention on  production problems. 
This  may  be  an  important  advantage. 
The  third potential  advantage  of contracting,  higher 
market returns  for  the  products,  is less certain and 
usually less easy to  prove.  In  the  example  given  a 
premium is paid by  the buyer but this is very likely  to  be 
offset by  the cost of running  the  group.  As  a  result 
of  the  group's  operation  and  the closer relationships 
established through contracting it is probable  that the 
average  quality of the  pigs will  improve,  and  this  should 
be reflected in higher realisations.  Through  control 
of supplies  in the  area the  group  may  be  able  through 
bargaining to obtain higher prices,  but it must  be 
recognised that the  tied outlet cannot afford to  pay 
higher prices  than its competitors  over  a  period  and 
still retain the business required to  provide  the  throughput 
of pigs  that producers  need.  In practice the  price 
objectives of contracting groups  of this kind  are  likely 
to be  limited to  providing  members  with  fair  and  more 
stable prices.  Realistically the  more  extravagent 
claims  of these  organisations  need  to be  regarded with 
considerable caution. 
4.  Disadvantages  of  cont~acting 
All  this  sounds,  in general,  very promising.  What 
are  the  disadvantages  of contracting?  Not all farmers 
will  welcome  the  idea of group  collaboration  and  group 
discipline that is  involved even  in such  a  loosely knit 
group  as  this  example.  They  may  resent having  the quality 
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of their products  known  to other members  and  prefer to 
avoid  any  regimentation of input purchasing.  Few  farmers 
like to  ask  their fellow group  members  for  permission to 
take credit from  the  group.  Some  dislike  the  idea of 
committing  themselves  over  their sales.  If the  group 
contracts  forward  with  fixed prices it is quite possible 
that prices will be  lower  than  the market at some  time 
during  the  pricing period.  Will  producers  remain  loyal 
to  the  scheme?  Even if the contract is open-ended  on 
prices,  which  are  then  determined  on  a  day basis in 
relation to  a  known  market price,  it is quite likely that 
the  slaughterhouse  will be  unable  always  to  pay the highest 
prices.  Finally,  what  happens  if the  slaughterhouse 
begins  to  lose its market position,  with  possible  adverse 
consequences  for its buying prices,  or if its demands 
slacken,  or if it even  closes its doors? 
Summarising  the  position,  the  major  potential 
disadvantages  of contracting are  loss of independence 
together  with greater interference in the  individual 
farmer's  business,  brought  about by the  need  for  quality 
control,  though clearly these  need not necessarily be  seen 
as  disadvantages;  isolation of individual  farmers  from 
direct contact with  the  market,  a  disadvantage  which  would 
mainly become  relevant if the  producer  gave  up  selling on 
contract;  and  the risk of choosing  the  wrong  contracting 
partner,  a  potentially fatal  disadvantage  which,  of course, 
applies  in  any business relationship. 
The  major  unknown  is the effect of contracting on 
farmers'  incomes.  In the  short run contracting farmers 
will  by definition have  more  predictable  incomes,and 
from year  to year  their  incomes  may  be  more  stable.  But 
in itself contracting need  have  no  certain and  indisputable 
effect on  market prices.  The  removal  from  the market of 
some  quantities of produce  r~1ay  even out the  peaks  and troughs  of market  movements  since  farmers  who  have  secured 
part of their income  through  forward  sales will be  less 
likely to be  forced  into selling at distressed prices, 
and  the  same  may  apply in reverse  to buyers.  But  the 
argument  can be  stood on its head  through maintaining 
that  a  farmer  who  has  sold part of his crop satisfactorily 
may  be  more  prepared to  dispose  of  the  remainder  at lower 
prices;  and  likewise that  a  buyer  can  afford to-pay 
higher prices  for  marginal  supplies.  Contract selling 
simply reduces  the  quantity to be  disposed of  through  the 
market.  This  narrowing of the market  may  well result in 
greater stability, but it could also make  the residual 
market  more volatile. 
Normally  a  residual market,  i.e. non-contracted 
market,  is essential  for  two  reasons.  First,  to clear 
supplies  over  and  above  quantities covered by contracts; 
and  secondly,  to  provide  a  price reference  which  may  be 
used  to  determine  the  price  to be effective for contracts. 
In discussions  about  the  use  of contracts  in agricultural 
marketing,people  sometimes  lose sight of the  obvious 
point that prices,  regardless of contracting,  cannot for 
long  deviate  from  equilibrium points  at which  supply  and 
demand  are  matched.  Prices  for  products  sold on contract 
cannot remain  for  any  length of time radically different 
from  open  market prices,  not only because  this is likely 
to  put  an  intolerable strain on  one  of the contracting 
parties,  but also because,  if the  quantity contracted 
represents  a  significant proportion of total supplies, 
either supply or  demand  will be  excessively stimulated 
or  depressed.  This  leaves  open  the question of what 
proportion of total supplies  should ideally be  sold under 
contract.  The  reports  from  the  individual countries 
offer no  clear guidance  on  this point.  The best that 
can be  done  is to indicate that factors  relevant to this 
question will  include  how volatile is the  supply of toe 
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product  (e.g.  whether it is affected by natural causes) 
how  many  different outlets exist,  and  whether it is perishable 
or can easily be  stored.  Unfortunately it is not possible 
to  lay  down  an  ideal  proportion of total supplies of each 
agricultural  product  which  should be  covered by contracts. 
5.  Risk  sharing  through  contracts 
Some  contract schemes  practised in the  enlarged  EEC 
contain,  or purport  to contain,  an  element of risk sharing 
on  market  prices  between  the parties.  Perhaps  the best 
known  of these  are  the  schemes  organised by  the  Dutch 
co-operatives,  notably in pig marketing.  But  there  are 
a  number  of other examples  provided in the reports  from 
the  member  countries,  e.g. contracts  for  eggs  with price 
guarantees  operated in France.  Briefly,  the  idea is that 
a  formula  is designed  so  that the  processor  accepts  part 
of  the brunt of falling market  prices  and  does  not  pass 
on  the  whole  impact  to  the  producer.  And  the  producer 
is given  an  addition  to his price if the  market rises. 
Other  interested parties,  notably suppliers of inputs, 
can  also  take  part.  For  instance,  in  a  vertically 
integrated broiler enterprise based  on contracts,  the  packing 
station could take  up  part of  a  fall  in prices  and  a 
contracted feed mill  another part,  so  that the  whole 
burden  does  not fall  on  the  producer. 
Before  assessing  the value  of  these  schemes  for 
producers  three  comments  on  them  need  to be  made. 
First, it must be  recognised that those  taking up 
what  is represented  as  part of the  "producer's risk" 
might  anyway be  for.ced  to  do  so.  There  is nothing 
sacred in the  margins  of broiler plants  (or  for  that 
matter  egg  packing  stations,  slaughterhouses  and  other 
potential risk sharers)  and  feed mills.  In conditions 
of over  supply they  too might  have  to cut margins 
regardless of  any  locked-in  formula,  which  anyway  is unlikely to be  arranged below the break-even point of  these 
interes~s.  In other words  without  a  risk sharing  scheme 
most broiler plants  and  feed mills  might well  have  to 
trim their prices  in order  to retain throughput.  It 
would  be  a  mistake  to exaggerate  their benevolence. 
Secondly,  those  taking part in risk sharing  schemes 
are  likely to  "pad"  their normal  margins  so  that-they are 
still left with  an  acceptable  average  margin  for  the year 
in the  event that risk sharing comes  into effect.  This 
would  be  no  more  than  provident business  practice.  In  a 
competitive market,  such  as  exists  for broilers,  a  processor 
cannot be  expected to obtain more  from  the  market  than his 
competitors.  In  turn he  cannot  pay producers, ·except  on 
a  very short-term basis,  more  than his  competitors.  And, 
finally,  it must be  recognised that risk sharing could 
anyway  work  to  the  detriment of producers  by shielding 
them  in the  short term  from  the realities of changes  in 
supply  and  demand  to  which  at  some  stage  they would  have 
to  face  up.  In other words  risk sharing,  if effective, 
may  delay  supply  adjustment in  an  over-supplied market. 
An  even  more  dangerous  effect would  be  produced if farmers 
were  encouraged  to enter pig or poultry production by risk 
sharing  schemes  which  cduld lull them  into ignoring  the 
fact  that these  activities have  always  been  strongly 
influenced by cycles. 
In  summary,  therefore,  the effect on  farm  prices of 
vertical integration through contracts can only be  regarded 
as  neutral,  though  there  may  be  beneficial effects  through 
the  secondary influences  already mentioned,  for  example 
production of what  the  market requires  and be'tter quality 
control.  A  more .promising  approach  to  the  problem of 
higher market realisations is through horizontal  integration, 
the  prospects  for  which  in conjunction with vertical 
integration are  discussed in Chapter VII. 
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6.  The  case  for  contracting:  for buyers  of farm  produce 
To  a  large extent the  third question posed earlier in 
this chapter  - the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of the use 
of contracts  from  the  point of view of buyers  of agricultural 
produce  - has  already been dealt with  through  the  analysis 
of the effects  on  producers.  Contracts  secure  supplies, 
ensure  a  certain level of price for  at least  a  part of  a 
processor's requirements,  enable  the  processor to  influence 
and  sometimes  to dictate production methods  from  an early 
part in the  production cycle,  and  through direct contact 
with  producers  to make  himself well  acquainted with all 
aspects  of production,  including costs.  To  a  large extent 
producers  and  processors  are motivated  towards  contracts 
for  the  same  reasons.  That is to  say both parties are 
more  anxious  to  make  contracts if the  products  in question 
are  of  a  specialised character,  if they are  perishable, 
if they  are difficult to store or expensive  to transport, 
if their production  and  processing  involve  large capital 
costs,  and if market prices  tend  towards  violent fluctuations. 
Indeed it is possible  to  draw up  a  sort of league  table of 
likely propensity to contract for  the various  agricultural 
products  based on  such criteria.1 • 
There  is therefore  a  strong basic identity of interest 
on  contracting between  producers  and  buyers  of agricultural 
products,  although  the  tension between  the  two  sides  of  the 
arrangements  must  persist over prices  and  the  terms  and 
conditions of contracts.  At  least it can be  argued that, 
due  in part to  the  pressures  on  them  from retailers  and 
their relatively high capital costs,  food  processors  must  be 
keenly interested in contracting.  It might be  as  well 
for  farmers  and  the  managers  of their marketing organisations 
to remind  themselves  from  time  to  time  that their customers 
1.  The  study on vertical integration and  the  use  of 
contracts in Germany cites such  a  table  drawn  from 
Dr.  von  Oppen's  Moglichkeiten und  Grenzen  der 
Anwendung  vertraglicher Regelungen beim  Absatz 
landwirtschaftlicher Produkte.  Braunschweig  -
Volkenrode  1969.  This  is reproduced  in  the Appendix. need contracts,  and  can benefit from  them,  at least as 
much  as  they  do. 
7.  Contracting between  farmers  and  their marketing organisations 
It is perhaps  appropriate  to note  at the  end of this 
chapter  the  important,  though  possibly obvious,  distinction 
between contracts  (or obligations  to deliver)  entered into 
between  farmers  and  their organisations,  and  those  made 
with buyers  of farm  produce either by these  organisations 
or by  individual  farmers.  As  stated in the last chapter 
the  former  is an essential prerequisite  for  the creation 
of strong co-operatives.  Whether  they then  make  contracts 
based  on  these  more  or less predictable  supplies,  or 
alternatively decide  to  trade without contracts,  is  a 
matter  for  individual  decision.  But membership  loyalty, 
which  frequently  may best be  secured through  a  contract, 
is vital for  a  producers'  organisation before it can with 
any confidence enter into contracts  with buyers.  Membership 
discipline based on clear-cut obligations is  a ~  qua ~ 
of effective group contracting. 
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IV 
THE  CASE  FOR  OWNERSHIP  VERTICAL  INTEGRATION 
1.  Contracts  or ownership vertical integration 
Some  marketing contracts in agriculture cover  only 
a  short period  and  involve little or  no  interference in 
the  running of the  farm business by  the contracting buyer. 
Others  contain more  stringent conditions  over  production, 
including  the  use  of certain feed  ingredients  and  avoidance 
of undesired chemicals,  to the extent that the buyer is 
necessarily involved closely in production techniques. 
If credit is extended,  this  involvement can  become  even 
more  intimate.  Most  marketing contracts  are  for  a 
production cycle or  for  a  season,  or  are  renewable  from 
year  to year,  but for  a  few  products  the  terms  of 
contracts  are  extended  to  several years.  Typically 
such  contracts  are  used  when  the life of one  or  more 
of  the  main  assets  involved in farm  production has  an 
extended life,  for  example,  specialised farm buildings 
and  peach  trees. 
Farmers  who  have  contracts with buyers  on  a  basis 
which  permits  close control of their operation  sometimes 
complain that they feel  as  though  they are virtually 
working  for  the  integrator.  Inputs  are  provided under 
the  control of the  integrator,  the  production process  is 
closely supervised,  and  the  farmer  is paid  a~ the  end of 
the  month  or  at  some  other period on  the basis of 
realisations  (the marketing,  of course,  being fully 
controlled by the  integrator),  less  the  costs  of inputs, 
including credit.  What  is the  difference between  this 
and being  an  employee  of the  integrator,  except that all 
or part of the  production risk  (through disease,  drought, 
etc.)  is borne by the  farmer?  Emotive  words  like  "slavery" have  been used  about  this  type  of integration on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
It will provide little comfort  to  the  farmer  to be 
told that he  did not have  to  sign  a  contract in the first 
place,  or that it is very possible that his business 
could  anyway not have  survived on  an  independent basis. 
There  is,  however,  one  important difference between  the 
condition of the  farmer,  even  in the  most  tightly integrated 
arrangement,  and  an  employee  of  an  ownership  integration 
scheme.  The  former  may,  at least theoretically,  extricate 
himself at the  end of the contract,  and  resume  an 
independent life on his  farm  or  make  a  contract elsewhere, 
whereas  the  latter has  parted with his  asset,  and re-entry 
into  independent  farming  might effectively mean  starting 
again. 
A  few  years  ago  ownership vertical integration, 
which  had  previously been  an  important issue  in 
agricultural policy in the  United States,  appeared 
to be  a  matter of  growing  concern  in Western  Europe. 
It was  thought that ownership  integration,  which  had 
already been established in the poultry industry,  might 
be  extended into other  types  of agricultural  activity 
on  an  important scale.  In fact in recent years  this 
development  has  in general  come  to  a  halt,  and  in  some 
cases  has  been reversed.  There  are  examples  of ownership 
integration in all branches  of agriculture in the enlarged 
EEC  but its extent is of insignificant importance,  outside 
the  poultry industry,  in relation to total agricultural 
production.  Chapter  VI  provides  some  examples 
on  this  matter.  This  chapter will be  concerned 
with  discussion of the  case  for  ownership vertical 
integration.  The  main questions  to be  answered  are: 
why  does  this process  take  place;  what  do  integrators 
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hope  to  achieve  by it;  and  what  factors  are  in practice 
most  likely to inhibit its development.  While  the 
motives  and  objectives of integrators  are  extremely 
diverse,  the main  ones  are  illustrated by the  following 
six cases. 
2.  Original  planning of ownership  ver~~cal integration 
First,  we  must  take  account of the  new  entrant to 
agriculture  who,  viewing  the  whole  agricultural  process  -
supply of inputs,  farm  production,  processing  and 
marketing  - might  attempt  to calculate what  economies 
could be  obtained by bringing together under  common 
ownership all or  some  of these  stages.  Such  an  observer 
looking  from  outside  at agriculture might regard closely 
possible  production economies,  but would be  more  likely 
to start his  train of thought  from  an  assessment of what 
would  constitute the right amount  of produce,  or proportion 
of the total market,to  justify setting up  an  independent 
marketing organisation.  The  assessment  would be  guided 
by  whether  the  market  for  the  product,  when  produced on 
a  large  scale,  is primarily local,  national,  or Community 
wide.  At least.it would be correct to start at the 
marketing  end because without security of outlet,  which 
will itself depend  on  market  strength,the integrated 
organisation will be  liable to  founder.  Having 
established what  level of output is required in marketing 
terms,  taking  account of possible collaboration with 
other interests,  the  integrator will  look at what 
economies  could be  achieved  as  a  result of operating  a 
fully integrated organisation capable of this  level of 
output.  The  main  potential  savings  would  be  through 
economies  in the  scale of production of  the  product 
itself,  in the manufacture  of inputs,  which  could include 
fixed  assets,  in transportation of both  inputs  and  products, 
and  in management  of all branches  of the enterprise. The  best example  drawn  from  Western  Europe  of  a  company 
which  developed  a  closely considered policy,  based 
largely on  the  thinking of one  individual,  to create 
from  the outset  a  vertically integrated organisation, 
is still provided by  J.B.  Eastwood Ltd. 
All  farmers  try to  work  towards  an  optimum scale 
of production.  They  are  limited,  as  is also  the 
integrator,  by  the  availability of land,  capital,  and 
management  resources.  The  last two  are,  at least 
theoretically,  capable of solution,  as  capital for buildings, 
etc.,  may  be  obtained if the  project is viable,  and 
management  can be hired.  Land,  however,  represents  a 
major  inhibition to these  developments  in Western  Europe, 
since  the  land market is restricted and prices high.  It 
is primarily for  this reason that large-scale ownership 
vertical integration has  effectively been  limited in 
Western  Europe  to the  intensive products,  but even  for 
these  some  agricultural land is normally required in 
order  to cope  with effluent problems,  and  to mitigate 
the  greater risks of disease  which  may  apply if intensive 
livestock units  are  grouped closely together.  Economies 
in the cost of inputs  can be  obtained through  knowledge 
of the  total requirements  of the  organisation  and  thus 
ability to create one  or  more  units of  an  optimum  size 
to  provide  them.  The  most  obvious  candidate is  a  feed 
mill  which  could also benefit from being  able  to make 
longer  and  more  predictable production runs,  but the 
argument  can be  applied to livestock inputs,  notably 
breeding stock,  day-old chicks,  and piglets,  farm 
/ 
buildings  for  housing  stock,  a  transport fleet,  and  so 
on.  Management  economies  are  likely to consist less 
in the possibilities of reducing costs  than  in the 
ability to  make  use  economically of specialists such 
as  nutritionalists  and veterinary experts. 
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Most  of these  economies  are  available in  an  integrated 
organisation based  on  contracts rather  than ownership,  and 
they can  apply particularly if there is  some  identity of 
interest between  the parties  (see Chapter VII),  but it 
must  be  recognised that under  common  ownership  the  long 
term  investment needed  in the various  parts of the  integrated 
organisation can be  made  with  much  greater confidence,  and 
therefore  with greater precision  as  to  the  capacity required, 
than  in  the  case of  a  contracted scheme,  even  one  under 
producers'  control.  And  clearly it would  be  likely to be 
easier to  develop  an effective central policy when  large 
numbers  of  somewhat  differing interests  do  not  have  to be 
taken  into consideration. 
3.  Increased  throughput  through  ownership vertical integration 
A  second  way  in which  ownership vertical integration 
is likely to occur  can be  illustrated by the  case of  a 
slaughterhouse,1 •  which  finds  that the  supplies of livestock 
that it is  able  to obtain  from its locality are  insufficient 
in relation to  an  economic  level of throughput.  The 
slaughterhouse might consider entering livestock production 
itself in order  to  increase its supplies  and  thereby  lower 
unit costs  involved in running  the plant.  The  most 
obvious  candidate  would  be  a  pig unit in which  production 
can  be built up  rapidly,  and  supplies  increased without 
additional  procurement costs.  In order  to  do  so  the 
slaughterhouse  would  have  to  have  available  the  required 
capital  and  obtain suitable management  for  the  new 
integrated production enterprise.  These  might be 
difficult to obtain.  Before  making  such  an  investment 
1.  The  same  argument  could be  applied to  an 
egg  packing  station,  broiler plant,  vegetable 
grading  and  packing station,  etc. the  slaughterhouse  should consider carefully why  adequate 
supplies  are  not  in fact  forthcoming.  Is  the  area under 
some  disadvantage  in relation to  livestock production? 
The  slaughterhouse might  also have  to consider  whether 
by entering livestock production,  and  thus  competing 
with its customers,  it might create  problems  for  the 
future,  perhaps  by providing  a  cause  for  its customers 
to  deal  with  a  rival organisation. 
A rather similar problem would be  presented to  a 
feed mill  which  is short of customers  in relation to its 
capacity.  The  mill could start an  integrated livestock 
enterprise which  would  take  up  some  of its output,  but 
the  economics  of the  activity in its own  right  and  customer 
reaction would  have  to be  considered.  In either case  the 
entry into ownership vertical integration is suggested by 
the  need  to cure  the  troubles  of  an  existing activity. 
Co-operative organisations could,  and  sometimes  do, 
create vertically integrated enterprises under  their 
own  ownership.  More  commonly  managers  of co-operatives 
have  to  take care not to over-encourage  their members  to 
expand  their production  simply in order  to  take  up  the 
capacity of  a  co-operative  feed mill or  to  provide 
throughput  for  a  co-operative  slaughterhouse. 
4.  Integrated agricultural merchants 
A  third road  towards  ownership vertical integration 
consists of integration into the  merchanting  sector,  a 
variant of  the  above.  This  normally takes  the  form  of 
manufacturers  of inputs,  particularly feeds,  buying  up 
firms  of merchants  which  then usually develop  gradually 
into exclusive outlets  for  the  manufacturers.  The 
largest private compound  feed manufacturer  in Denmark 
now  sells virtually all its feed  through controlled outlets. 
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All  the  national  feed  companies  in Britain own  some  merchant 
businesses.  Integration into merchanting can  also  come 
from  the  other direction,  notably  from  flour millers. 
The  objective in either case is much  the  same;  in the 
former  to control distribution outlets  and in the  latter 
to  possess  a  grain gathering organisation working  solely 
in  the  processor's interests.  The  main  significance of 
these  developments,  which  are  not widely established in 
Western  Europe,  is that it is  an  area into which  producers 
have,  of course,  already moved  through their co-operatives. 
Vertical  integration into merchanting by private companies, 
either suppliers of inputs  or buyers  of agricultural produce, 
is  likely to introduce greater strength into private 
merchanting  in its competition with co-operatives. 
5.  The  food  industry  and  ownership vertical integration 
Fourthly,  ownership vertical integration can  take 
place under  the control of  food  processors  or even  the 
larger  food retailing organisations.  So  far  as  the 
latter is concerned  the  question whether it pays  to  own 
production facilities  linked to  the  demands  of retail shops 
has  been  an  issue  for  many years.  A  good  example  is 
provided by  the  consumer  co-operatives in Britain which 
through  the Co-operative  Wholesale  Society at one  time 
owned  a  large  number  of factories  supplying  the  shops 
with  shoes,  furniture,  etc.,  and,  on  the  food  side,  egg 
packing  stations,  flour mills,  bacon  factories,  and 
canning plants,  as  well  as  farm  production itself (as 
Britain's largest farmers)  and  agricultural  inputs  in 
the  form  of feed mills.  In recent years  the  trend in 
Western  Europe  has  been  for  food  processors  to keep  out 
of agriculture  and retailers to  avoid extending  their 
direct interests in food  processing.  In both cases  the 
main  motive  has  been financial,that is to  say,  the  desire 
to concentrate  limited resources  on  the  nLain  business. In  the  case of food retailers it has  been  found  that it 
has  usually been cheaper  to have  the rapidly increasing 
volume  of  "own-brand"  merchandise  manufactured under 
contract by  independent processors. 
The  principal cause\ of backwards  ownership  integration 
of this kind exists  when  the potential integrator finds 
that he  cannot obtain,  either in the  open  market or  through 
the  use  of contracts,  the quality of supplies  he  requires 
at the right price.  While  this motive,  which  for  example 
prompted  a  large  family controlled retailer in Britain 
(Sainsburys)  to engage  in bacon curing,  could recur,  it 
is  unlike~y to be  an  important  force  in the  future,  as 
agricultural  and  processing  techniques  improve.  Another 
subsidiary motive  for  backwards  integration is that through 
ownership of  an  anterior stage  in the  chain which  supplies 
part of its requirements  a  firm  knows  from  direct experience 
more  about  the  problems  and costs of the  industry acting 
as  its supplier.  But,  as  was  pointed out earlier in this 
report,  this benefit may  also be  obtainable  through 
contracting. 
6.  Breaking out of  an  oligopsonistic market 
Another  case  for  ownership vertical integration  ari~:;cs 
when  an organisation  (including  a  co-operative)  finds 
itself operating in  a  very imperfect market characterised 
by oligopsony,  a  market  in which  competition for  the 
organisation's products  is feeble,  and  large profits  are 
being  made  at the  posterior stage.  There  may  be  only 
two  ways  to break out  from  this situation - by effective 
control of supplies  on  a  horizontal basis,  most  likely in 
collaboration with other interests,  or by  forwards 
integration. 
The  case  for  the  development of ownership  integration 
in oligopsonistic conditions is currently very relevant to 
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producers'  organisations,  and requires  further  comment. 
In considering their  income  problems  farmers  have  often 
been  inclined to  look  with  some  astonishment at the  level 
of consumer  food  prices  and  compare  this with  what  they 
get  for  products  as  they leave  the  farm.  The  difference 
between  the  two  is large,  and  has  been  tending  to  increase. 
~armers have,  therefore,  felt that one  of the  ways  to 
improve  their  incomes  would be  to  integrate  forward  beyond 
~he first marketing  stage  into processing,  perhaps  beyond 
t::he  processing,  packaging  and  grading  stage  into  food 
wholesaling,  and  perhaps  ideally beyond  that into retailing. 
It is understandable  that many  outside observers 
view  these  arguments  with  some  scepticism.  Any  analysis 
of  an  industry's  problems  that sees  the  solutions  as  lying 
rnainly  outside  that industry can reasonably be  regarded 
with  some  suspicion.  Besides,  vertical integration 
forwards  clearly cannot represent  any general  solution 
to  agriculture's  income  difficulties,  since  some  sections 
~)£  the  food  industry in  some,  but not all,  EEC  countries 
show  a  poor  return on capital  (e.g.  flour milling)  others 
rllready  have  a  strong co-operative  sector  (e.g.  sugar 
.~.:-efining),  and  others  appear  to be  highly competitive 
(e.g.  vegetable canning).  So  there can be  no  overall 
~olution to  the  farm  income  problem  as  a  result of vertical 
integration forwards. 
Two  other points,  both negative,  must  be  added. 
~irst,  there is no  reason  to  suppose  that producers' 
organisations will  make  a  much better  job of food 
processing  than existing  firms  in the  industry,  some 
of  which  are  international  and  apparently well  managed. 
Secondly,  entry by producers'  organisations  into  a 
section of  the  food  industry on  a  substantial scale 
might  alter the balance of that industry,  and  be  likely 
to  lead to  lower  margins.  In other words  producers' organisations  which  detect,  or  suspect,  favourable  profit 
margins  in  a  posterior stage  should not necessarily  assume 
that these  margins  will  remain  indefinitely available  to 
them. 
7.  Investment motives  in vertical integration 
Finally,  pressure of investment  funds  can be  a  cause 
of ownership vertical integration,  a  point made  in an 
earlier chapter.  In all  forms  of economic  activity 
individuals  and  organisations  are  faced  with  the  problem 
of how best to  invest surplus  funds.  Often one  of the 
most  obvious  opportunities consists in buying  out  a  customer 
or  a  supplier,  thereby creating  common  ownership of  two 
of the  links  in the vertical chain.  This  motive  applies 
to  companies  in the  food  and  agricultural input industries, 
and  particularly the  former,  which  has  recently witnessed 
a  spate of mergers  and  take-overs,  some  of which  have  had 
the  effect of creating ownership vertical integration 
apparently  as  much  by chance  and  the  need  to  "keep moving" 
as  by  deliberate  design of corporate policy.  This 
motive  is unlikely to  apply to  farmers  as  individuals  who 
seem  to prefer  to  place outside  agriculture surplus  funds 
not required in their individual  farm businesses,  nor  to 
co-operative organisations  which  are very frequently 
short of capital  and usually have  no  problem.  about  how 
to use  their spare  funds  within  their existing businesses 
8.  The  case  for  ownership  integration 
forwards  by producers'  organisations 
Having  taken  a  somewhat cautious  view of the  general 
case  for  integration forwards  by  agricultural interests, 
it must be  added  that producers'  organisations  should 
keep  this possibility under  continual review.  Special 
situations  may  arise  in which it could make  sense  to 
integrate forwards.  This  is most  likely to  apply  when 
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the  producers'  organisation happens  to  possess  the necessary 
management  expertise  which  will  allow it to  develop  in this 
way.  But it must  be  recognised  that if it moves  into the 
food  industry in  a  substantial  way,  agriculture will be 
facing  an  entirely different environment,  one  which  lacks 
the  special  market  protection which  has  been  afforded to 
farmers.  The  priority will  always  be  to  attempt to 
organise effective horizontal integration so  that a  strong 
base exists for  taking  on  the partly unknown  problems 
associated with entry into the  food  industry. 
Looking  to  the  future it seems  likely that ownership 
vertical integration will continue,  and possibly be 
extended,  in eggs  and broiler production;  that it will 
have  spread within  a  few  years  on  a  substantial scale  to 
pigmeat  production;  that  some  developments  will  occur  in 
the beef  and  veal  sector;  that it will expand  in  some  of 
the  minor  products  (like  turkeys  and  ducks);  but that 
there will be  no  overall  increase of  any great substance 
in the  incidence of this  type of ownership  and control 
in relation to total production.  Some  of the  more 
compelling reasons  for  the  development of the  process  in 
the past,  which  have  been noted  above,  particularly the 
problem of obtaining  the right quality and regularity of 
supply,  are  likely to become  of diminishing  importance  in 
the  future.  The  reluctant integrator should be  able  to 
find other means  of disposing of his output or  securing 
his  supplies,  which  could include  the  use of contracts 
and  the  formation  of  joint ventures,  another  method of 
co-ordinating agricultural  supplies  with market requirements, 
which  is described in the  following  chapter. v 
NEW  MARKETING  RELATIONSHIPS  FOR 
PRODUCERS'  ORGANISATIONS 
1.  Another  method of co-ordinating supply  and  demand? 
The  last two  chapters  have  been concerned with  two 
methods  of co-ordinating  supply  and  demand  of agricultural 
products  which  function outside  the  normal  pricing 
operation of the  open market.  Both contracting  and 
ownership vertical integration,  and particularly the  former, 
have  something  to offer in co-ordinating agricultural 
marketing.  But  they also have  a  number  of  important 
disadvantages  from  the poinl  of view of both parties. 
For  farmers  contracting presents  problems  over  fixing 
prices  (as it does  also  for buyers),  over  interference 
by  an  outsider in their businesses,  and  over restricting 
them  to  farm  production. from  which  they may  wish  partly 
to escape.  From  the  point of view of both agriculturalist 
and buyer  of  farm  produce  the  main  problems  implied by 
ownership vertical integration are  how  to obtain management 
talent for  the  larger integrated business  and  how  to raise 
the  necessary finance. 
The  question arises  whether it is not possible  to 
find  some  other solution to  the  problem of co-ordinating 
agricultural marketing.  Can  organic relationships be 
established capable of creating closer identity of interest.: 
than exists in contracting without the "all or nothing" 
aspect of ownership vertical integration?  Farmers  and 
their organisations  have  the  advantages  of controlling 
supplies  of farm  products,  of strength in first stage 
marketing,  of knowledge  of  some  types  of processing, 
and  of interest in the  q~alities of their own  products 
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related to  processing requirements.  Companies  in the 
food  industry usually have  well  established market 
outlets,  good  information  on  the  markets  for  food  products, 
and  knowledge  in varying  degrees  of the  farm  products 
required for  the  purposes  of their processing,  and  of how 
they should be  produced.  Would it not be  possible  to bring 
these  two  sets of talents  together  in an  organic  whole, 
which  wou~d also  provide  a  vehicle  for  receiving-investments 
from  both sides  and  thus  ease  the  financial  problem  which 
either might  have  on  their own?  Essentially this is the 
thinking  which  lies behind the  idea that agriculture might 
engage  in so-called "joint ventures" with non-agricultural 
interests,  most  of whom  would be  likely to be  food  processors, 
though  some  partners could  also be  drawn  from  the  agricultural 
input industries. 
The  term  joint venture is rather novel  and  there  may 
be  some  doubts  as  to  what it is intended to describe.  In 
English  the  term has  an  attractive ring  about it;  the 
project or  investment  so  described  sounds  risky  and  a  little 
romantic,  but still - through  the  inclusion of the  word 
joint - reassuringly solid.  It evokes  a  picture of  a 
sixteenth century merchant  adventurer  backed by his  Sovereign, 
who  sets sail into  the  unknown  to earn  a  fortune  for  his 
backers,  but not without  taking out heavy  insurance  cover 
to protect the  interests of these  investors. 
2.  Joint ventures  outside  agriculture 
Before  turning  to  joint v~ntures as  applied  to  the 
peculiar situation of agriculture, it might be  useful  to 
make  some  brief comments  on  how  the  expression is used  in 
industry.  A  joint venture can be  seen  as  an  alternative 
to  a  full  merger  between industrial  companies.  It applies 
under  three  main  circumstances.  First,  when  two  or more 
companies  have  a  mutual  interest that they wish  to pursue together  which is limited to  a  part of their business. 
For  example,  two  companies  in the  soft drinks  industry 
might  decide  to set up  a  jointly owned bottling plant. 
Alternatively,  if they were  large  enough,  they might 
decide  to undertake  joint research  on bottling problems. 
Secondly,  when  two  or more  companies  with different 
skills,  or  with control  over different inputs,  wish  to 
join together  to carry out  a  common  task.  An  illustration 
of this is provided by  the  formation  of  a  consortium in the 
construction industry.  In  a  large road building project 
undertaken by private construction companies  a  consortium 
is often formed  that brings  together complementary skills 
and  experience  which  will be  devoted  in common  to  the 
project.  The  third typical case  for  a  joint venture 
arises  when  the  parties  to  a  project with  similar interests, 
skills, etc.,  join  together  for  a  limited time.  A  simple 
example  of this is provided by chartering  a  vessel.  Since 
joint ventures usually involve  some  financing,  one  of the 
partners  may  well  be  an  investment bank or other  financial 
institution,  and  government  financial  assistance  may  be 
made  available.  While  a  new organisation is often created 
to  form  the  joint venture,  there  is no  necessity to have 
a  separate corporate entity,  for  example  in the case of 
joint research.  But  the  parties will,  of course,  need 
an  agreement,  and will require  separate accountability 
for  the  joint activity. 
3.  Difficulties involved in  joint ventures. 
Examples  of  joint ventures  for  purposes  such  as  those 
mentioned  above  can be cited from  many  branches  of industry, 
despite  the rather obvious  difficulties which  this  type  of 
operation involves.  These  difficulties arise  from  problems 
such  as  "What  sort of research  should our  joint venture 
concentrate on?",  and  "What  happens if it is concerned with 
a  product in which  we  are competitively interested?"; 
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or,  in the case  o~  a  consortium in the construction industry 
"What  is the right price for  the  inputs  provided by each 
partner,  and  how  much  should  seconded experts be  paid?"; 
and,  for  all  joint ventures  "What  are  the  appro~riate 
penalties  for  non-performance  by one  of the  partners?" 
Joint ventures  are  like  a  marriage,  a  common  activity 
without total identity of interest,  with  the  additional 
difficulty that it may  be  agreed  from  the outset in the 
case of  an  industrial  joint venture  that it will be  limited 
to  a  short period.  The  possibility of frequent misunder-
standings between partners in joint ventures  are  so great 
that these  schemes  are  more  likely to be  confined to use 
between parties  who  have  worked  together previously,  or 
believe that they have  sufficient good will  towards  each 
other to be  able  to reach  agreement  on matters  which  could 
not have  been  anticipated when  the original contract for 
the  joint venture  was  drawn  up. 
In industry informal  ties  are very frequently established 
between  companies  either horizontally or vertically and 
these can  develop naturally into joint ventures.  But it 
must  be  stressed that very  few  industrial  joint ventures 
could be  described  as  vertical in the  sense  that the  joint 
venture is owned  by companies  on either side of it in the 
integration chain.  By contrast,  while it is still 
difficult to find examples  in some  countries  in Western 
Europe  of joint ventures  in agriculture  there  are  already 
a  sufficient total number  of joint ventures  in vertical 
integration in agriculture to  justify concluding that they 
could  make  a  further  substantial  impact  on  agricultural 
marketing in the near  future. 
3.  Joint ventures  in agriculture 
This  might be  an  appropriate  stage to give  some 
examples  of this process  in agriculture.  Neighbouring arable  farmers  who  have  traditionally sold their output 
through  a  potato merchant,  decide  to set up  a  disciplined 
marketing  group.  They  need grading,  packing  and  storage 
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facilities.  The  merchant  fearful  that he  might  lose  an 
important part of his business  as  may  well  occur if the 
group  decides  to market its own  produce· direct,  might 
be  interested in  a  jointly owned  organisation to run  the 
facility.  This  company  cou~d make  contracts with both 
the  producers  and  the  merchant.  The  financial  structure 
of the  new  company  could consist of equity capital 
subscribed by the  two  partners,  loans  from  banks,  and 
also possibly  a  capital grant  from central or state 
government  funds.  The  merchant  would sell the  group's 
output on  commission.  The  proceeds  of sales·,  less 
commissions,  would be credited to  the  joint venture's 
account.  After deducting costs of production,  including 
an  agreed rate of interest on capital employed,  the 
remainder  would be  distributed to  members  in proportion 
to their deliveries.  A  second  example  might  also be 
drawn  from  the  potato industry.  A manufacturer of instant 
potatoes  or  potato crisps wishes  to install specialise4 
plant.  He  is already drawing his  supplies  from  a  group 
which  has  adequate  grading facilities,  etc.  It might 
make  sense  for  the  proposed  investment  to be  jointly 
financed by the  two  parties.  In this case,  unlike  the 
former,  there will be  a  problem over  price determination. 
And,  thirdly,  one  could  take  the  example  of  a  specialised 
group  of vegetable  growers,  perhaps carrots or  onions, 
contracted to  a  number  of processors but selling  a  major 
proportion to one  of  them.  The  latter might be  interested 
in securing its position with  the  group especially if it 
regarded these  supplies  as  particularly suitable.  If the 
group  wished  to take  in additional  funds  for  new  grading 
or  pre-packing_machinery,  an  arrangement could be  made 
whereby  a  separate organisation was  established jointly 
financed by  the processor  and  the  group. 
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In  livestock  and  livestock products  much  the  same 
pattern can be repeated.  An  egg-packing station can be 
jointly owned  and controlled by  a  group  of  farmers  supplying 
eggs  on contract and by  an  egg  wholesaler or  a  large 
retailing organisation contracted with  a  packing  station 
for  a  proportion of its output.  Likewise,  a  slaughter-
house  can be  jointly owned  by interests  on either side  in 
the vertical chain,  as  can  any  other  function  in_the chain. 
In  addition  an  extra link can be  inserted into the  chain  to 
act  as  a  buffer for  price determination between  the parties 
who  would  otherwise be  contracted directly together.  This 
might be  illustrated from  the  agricultural  input industry's 
use  of  feed contracts.  A merchanting  company could be 
jointly owned by  a  feed mill  and  a  group  of livestock 
producers  who  were  important local  consumers  of feed. 
Both  could contract with  the  merchant  as  their  joint venture, 
which  would  act  as  a  forum  for  deciding  what  the mill  should 
receive  and  the  group  pay  for  feed. 
4.  The  potential contribution of  joint ventures 
The  potential difficulties  involved in  joint ventures, 
over  price determination  and  quality control,  over  management, 
over  the  level of retention appropriate  to it, over  the 
balance of  investment between  the  two  parties  and  over  the 
very obvious  problem of finding compatible partners,  have 
already been  indicated and  require  no  further  comment. 
It might,  however,  be  useful  to  summarise  what  this 
development,  in its infancy in Western  Europe,  might  have 
to offer to  the  chain of agricultural marketing.  First, 
by establishing  a  joint venture,  the  parties  who  would 
otherwise be contracted together  with  one  of  them  owning 
entirely the  plant or  trading  function  in question,  go 
somewhat  beyond  even  a  long  term contract in declaring 
their intention to  work closely together.  Through 
making  a  joint investment they are  more  committed  to ensuring  success  for  their relationship in the  long  term 
than  would be  the  case  through  the  use  of contracts. 
Secondly,  both parties  should  achieve  greater security. 
By  creating  a  financial  link with  a  group  of producers 
a  buyer of agricultural  produce  should feel  more  secure 
in his  sources  of supply.  There  should be  some  benefit 
to  producers  in having  a  buyer  more  closely integrated 
to  their group.  But by contrast both,  of  cours~,  lose 
some  freedom  of manoeuvre.  Thirdly,  through  joint ventures 
producers  and  their organisations  can realise their 
understandable  aspirations  to  move  beyond  the  production 
and  first marketing  stage,  and  do  so  without being  solely 
responsible  for  the  management  of what might be  a  new  area 
for  them.  Fourthly,  unit costs  in  a  joint venture  should 
be  low  since  most  supplies  to it and  most  sales  from it 
will be  secured.  Throughput  is therefore  assured  and 
production costs  should be  kept to  a  minimum.  Fifthly, 
by creating  a  formal  link between  the parties  in the 
form  of  a  joint venture it should be  possible  to  solve 
more  readily any other problems which  arise in the 
relationship apart  from  pricing  and  quality,  and  a  two-
way  exchange  of technical  information should be  facilitated. 
Finally,  there is the all important question of finance 
which  is likely to be  the  major  advantage  of  a  joint venture 
in vertical integration in agriculture.  There  are  several 
aspects  of this.  In the first place both parties  may  be 
unable,  or unwilling,  to  make  the full  investment  on  their 
own.  Apart  from  the equity element  a  joint venture  should 
be  able  to attract capital  from  private  sources,  where  these 
exist,  on  a  more  generous  scale or on better terms  than 
would  be  available  to one  partner on his  own.  Banks  and 
other financial  institutions would  be  likely to  appreciate 
that both parties  are  committed  to  fixing  their prices  to 
and  from  the  joint venture  so  that it remains  viable,  as 
otherwise  they will have  lost respectively  a  secured 
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marketing outlet and  a  secured supplier,  capable  presumably 
of delivering  just the quality that is required.  In other 
words  there is scope  for both parties to adjust the position 
so  that the  joint venture  stays  solvent. 
Another  important element in the  financing  of joint 
ventures  is likely to be  support  from  the  State.  If it 
is felt that these organisations can play an  important 
role in improving  agricultural marketing  to  the benefit 
of producers,  tax payers,  the  food  industries,  and,  last 
but not least,  consumers,  there could be  a  justification 
for  making  government  funds  available to  them,  at least 
for  a  number  of years,  while  their function is being 
established,  and  their practical contribution assessed. 
Aid  could  take  the  form  of capital grants  or subsidised 
interest rates for credit or  a  combination of the  two. 
Argument  about  the  appropriate  scale of aid lies outside 
the  scope  of this report.  The  amount  of financial 
assistance provided could be  influenced by  the  extent 
of their commitment,  and  also by the  security offered 
through  the capital structure of the  joint venture.  The 
relative level of investment by  the  two  partners  might be 
arranged  so  that neither partner can  dominate  the other. 
To  obtain the  rig~t balance of influence between  the 
parties is  anyway vitally important.  Provided  assurances 
were  obtained on  these points  financial  assistance might 
more  appropriately be related to  the  total capital 
requirement of the  new  organisation rather  than be  limited 
to  the  proportion subscribed by producers. VI 
THE  CURRENT  STATE  OF  VERTICAL  INTEGRATION  IN 
AGRICULTURE  IN  THE  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  ENLARGED  EEC 
This  chapter contains  examples  of vertical integration 
arrangements  drawn  from  the nine countries  which  are  now 
members  of the  EEC.  The  Commission has  initiated individual 
studies of the situation in France,  the Netherlands,  Belgium,  Italy and 
Germany,fromwhich,  as  indicated in the Foreword of this report,  the 
latter three have already been published. 
These  five  studies contain  a  detailed examination of 
the state of vertical integration in agriculture in each 
country.  They constitute self-contained documents  and 
deserve  to be  studied in their own  right.  The  examples 
quoted  in this chapter are  therefore  limited in number. 
The  main  purpose  of the chapter is to  provide  some 
illustrations of developments  in the Community  as  a 
background  to  the  summary  at the  end  designed to indicate 
the  main  reasons  why vertical integration has  emerged  in 
different forms  and  to  a  varying extent for  the  range  of 
agricultural products  of principal  importance  in the  member 
countries of the  Community.  The  countries  are  treated 
below in alphabetical order. 
Apart  from  sugar-beet  and cereal  and  other  seeds, 
which  require  no  comment  on  a  national basis  since  they 
are  grown  on contract throughout  Western  Europe,  the  main 
products  in Belgium which  are  subject to vertical integration 
arrangements  are  eggs  and broilers,  veal calves,  pigs 
and  some  vegetables.  Contracting is not normally used 
for  marketing brewing barley,  and  most  potatoes  are  sold 
on  a  spot basis.  Milk is only subject to contract in so 
far  as  contractual deliveries  are  made  to dairies,  about 
50  per cent of supplies  going  to  the co-operatives. 
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As  elsewhere  in the  Community broilers  are  the  main 
farm  products  covered by contracts,  some  90  per cent of 
supplies  being integrated with  processing plants.  A 
much  lower  proportion of egg  production is integrated in 
Belgium,  approximately  40  - 60  per cent,  the  development 
dating  only  from  1965/66.  The  initiative in contract 
production  was  taken by manufacturers  of feedingstuffs 
wishing  to  reduce under-utilisation of their production 
capacity.  Over  the  past  few  years  the  increased egg 
production has  been mainly  as  a  result of the  spread of 
contracts.  Substantial credit facilities  have  been 
provided,  partly by  the  feed  industry for  investment in 
new  production units,  and  in the  purchase of feedingstuffs. 
Apparently,  it has  been mainly  farmers  whose  economic  position is weak 
who  have  decided to participate in contract  schemes.  They  believe that 
contract production will  expand still further in the future. 
Contract production of veal  calves  in Belgium dates 
from  the  mid-1950's  when  milk substitutes became  available, 
and it consequently became  possible  to  divorce  production 
from  dairy  farming  and  to undertake it on  a  large  scale. 
'rhe  feed  industry began  to  take  an  interest in this sector 
and  wholesalers  introduced contracts  for  the  supply of 
bobby calves  and  the  marketing of finished veal calves. 
rrhese  wholesalers  have  now  acquired  a  key position in 
contract production.  Farmers  have  been  induced  to  sign 
contracts because  financial  support is provided by  the 
contracting parties  (the  feedingstuffs  manufacturers  and 
the  wholesalers),  because  they wish  to reduce  market risks 
and  obtain  a  more  stable  income,  and because  of the 
advantage  of secured  supplies of bobby calves.  About 
65  - 85  per cent of veal calf production in Belgium is 
now  done  on contract. Production of pigs under contract in Belgium began 
about  15  - 20  years  ago  and  was  mainly inititated by  the 
feed  industry,  manufacturers  and merchants.  A variety 
of contracts is used.  These  include  wage  contracts, 
whereby  the  farmer  simply supplies  farm buildings  and 
undertakes  to  look  after  the· pigs  which  remain  the 
property of the contractor,  usually the  supplier of the 
feed.  The  farmer  receives  a  fixed  remuneration.  There 
are  varying  ways  of dealing with  the  production risk, 
e.g.  over  conversion rates.  Sometimes  contracts 
are  drawn  up  which  leave  the  whole  production risk,  and 
at least part of the  market risk,  with  the  farmer,  who 
therefore has  a  more  important entrepreneurial role. 
Contracts  with  some  element of price guarantees  can  take 
the  form  of  a  sale at  a  fixed price,  a  sale with  a  guarantc::ed 
minimum  price,or  a  sale with  a  bottom price  and  a  ceiling 
price.  In  the last case  the  farmer  suffers  the  market 
fluctuations  within certain limits,  i.e. he  is protected 
against severe market  depression,  but does  not have  the 
benefit of unusually high market realisations.  Using 
primarily the  evidence of  a  survey made  by  the  Boerenbond 
in 1970,  the  authomof the  Belgian report considers  that 
at least  35  per cent of pig production is done  on contract. 
Turning  to vegetables,  nearly all peas  are  grown 
under contract in Belgium,  and  about  70  per cent of 
beans,  60  per cent of carrots  and  50  per cent of salsify. 
The  main  difference between  the  various  forms  of contract 
lies in the  manner  in which  production  and market risks 
are  shared between  the partners.  In the majority of 
contracts  for  pea production  (about  85  per cent of all 
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contracts  for  peas)  the contractor bears  all the risks. 
The  grower  simply receives  a  fixed price per hectare,  for 
which  he  has  to  make  his  land  available  and  perform certain 
husbandry tasks  excluding harvesting.  For  other contracts 
in which  the risks  are  shared between  the partners,  the 
major  difference consists of which  partner decides  the 
time  of sowing  and  the variety to be  used.  About  two-
thirds of total supplies of chicory in Belgium  are  marketed 
on  contract  and  about half the national  production of hops. 
Britain is the  only country in the enlarged  EEC  to 
have  carried out recently  a  full  scale  government  inquiry 
into the use  of contracts  in agriculture.  The  results 
of this  inquiry,1·published in October  1972,  showed  that 
a  total of about  40  per cent  (or  roughly £1,000  mn.)  of 
farm  produce  in Britain is affected by contracts of one 
kind or  another.  However,  setting aside  grains  (forward 
contracts registered with  the  Home-Grown  Cereals  Authority), 
sugar beet  (all production contracted with  the British 
Sugar Corporation),  and  products  marketed  through  statutory 
marketing boards  (notably milk),  only about  11  per cent of 
total agricultural output  was  marketed  on contract.  The 
inquiry showed  that products  for  which  contracts  were  most 
important  included broilers  (48  per cent),  fat pigs  (33 
per cent),  eggs  (22  per cent),  and certain soft fruits 
(notably blackcurrants  50  per cent,  raspberries  39  per cent 
and  strawberries  25  per cent),  and  some  vegetables  for 
processing  (notably peas  and  broad beans  each  about  70  per 
cent  and  carrots  25  per cent).  The  main  conclusions of the 
Committee  of Inquiry were  "that there is scope  for  more 
contract farming;  that encouragement is required for  more 
horizontal  grouping  of producers;  and  that there is urgent 
need  for  a  co-ordinating body  spanning  agricultural marketing 
1.  Report of the  Committee  of Inquiry on contract 
farming,  HMSO,  October  1972,  Cmnd.  5099. and  production".  The  British government  welcomed  the 
report but has  yet to  accept its detailed findings  and 
recommendations. 
Attitudes  to contracting in agriculture in Britain 
have  undergone  rapid change  in recent years.  Some  ten 
or  fifteen years  ago  there  was  widespread  suspicion of 
contracts  and  some  resistance  to their use  on  the  part 
of producers.  Now  it appears  that it is the better 
educated  and  more  progressive  farmers  who  are  most  likely 
to participate in contract farming.  The  inquiry revealec 
a  high  degree  of satisfaction  (some  90  per cent of 
producers)  over contracts.  The  main benefits to be 
obtained were  seen  as  improved  income  stability  (84  per  cent 
of all contractors),  this being regarded  as  much  more 
important  than the  following  two  potential  advantages  -
reduction in expenses  and  higher market returns,  respectively 
11  and  9  per cent of all producers.  The  main  disadvantage 
appeared  to be  the  loss of flexibility which  inevitably 
follows  from  the  use  of contracts. 
In Britain contracts with buyers  of agricultural 
products  are  made  either by  individual  farmers  or by 
producers'  organisations,  many  of which  enjoy  a  disciplined 
membership contracted to  supply all or  a  proportion of 
their output of the  product in question.  The  relative 
importance of the  latter is tending  to increase but 
individual contracts  are still common.  Ownership 
integration on  any  scale is confined to broilers  and eggs. 
The  best-known case  is that of J.B.  Eastwood Ltd.,  a 
company  which  over  a  period of some  15  years  has  established 
a  position of considerable market  strength in both broilers 
and  eggs.  Eastwood is  a  fully integrated organisation, 
owning  feed mills,  hatcheries,  egg-packing  stations  and 
broiler processing plants  as  well  as  several  thousand 
hectares  of agricultural  land,required for  the  disposal 
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of manure, and its own  building construction unit.1 • 
There  are,  however,  examples  of ownership vertical 
integration in other  types  of production.  Typically 
these consist of retailers  owning  packing or processing 
plants  (Sainsbury's  is  a  good  example  of  a  retailer 
with  integrated supplies  of bacon  and  other meat  products), 
slaughterhouses  possessing part-integrated supplies,  and 
feed  mills  owning  livestock units,  hatcheries or specialised 
pig breeding enterprises.  The  situation appears  to be 
rather stable.  Food  processors  and retailers are 
currently showing little interest in integrating back-
wards  into farm  production.  The  impetus  towards  ownership 
integration forwards  on  the  part of manufacturers  of animal 
feeds  seems  to have  come  to  a  halt.  Indeed there  are 
signs  that the  policies  of  the  national  feed companies 
are  tending  to  favour  disengagement  from  livestock 
production under  their  own  proprietorship.  Any  further 
development of integration under unified ownership  is 
likely to be  carried out under  the  control of producers' 
organisations,  but even  here  there is no  reason  to 
anticipate  any rapid or  pronounced  trend. 
Of  the  three  new  member  countries  there is probably 
most  to be  learned  about  agricultural marketing  in 
Denmark,  where  the  exacting requirements  of foreign 
markets  and  the  absence  of  any substantial natural 
competitive  advantages  have  compelled  farmers'  organisations 
to  adopt  a  very high  level of sophistication.  The  system 
is  firmly based  on co-operation which  plays  an  important 
role  in the  marketing  and  processing of all agricultural 
products.  In particular co-operatives  dominate  the 
dairy  and  pigmeat  industries  (together constituting 
about  two-thirds  of total agricultural production in 
1.  The  development  of this  company  and  some 
other cases  of vertical integration,in Britain 
are  described in Butterwick M.W.,  Vertical 
Integration  and  the  Role  of the Co-operatives, 
The  Central Council  for  Agricultural  and 
Horticultural Co-operation,  London,  1969. Denmark),  in both of which  their market  share  amounts 
to  about  90  per cent.  Co-operation is voluntary,  but 
the effect of this  dominating  position is that in many 
parts of the  country dairy  and  pig  farmers  have little 
alternative but to  deal  with  their co-operative.  In 
these  circumstances vertical integration,  accompanied by 
strict quality control,  can be  achieved under co-operative 
leadership without  the  use  of contracts.  In recent years 
agricultural co-operation has  been  strengthened  as  a 
result of the  delegation by  the  government of powers  over 
the  disposition of the  Sales  Promotion  Fund  (grant-aided 
by  the  government)  to  a  committee  on  which  co-operatives 
are  strongly represented.  But  the basis  for  co-operative 
strength in Denmark  lies in the  efficiency  and professional-
ism of its management.  In general  Danish  farmers  have 
concurred in the  surrender of marketing responsibility, 
including  a  fairly high  degree  of control  over  their 
production methods,  because  they feel  that their co-
operatives  do  a  good  job  for  them.  Nevertheless,  the 
recent reorganisation of the  co-operative dairies  has 
caused considerable unrest  and  there  seems  to  be  evidence 
that farmers  are becoming  more critical of both input 
prices  available  from  co-operatives  and  market  prices 
obtained by  them.  It is significant that,  until recently, 
co-operatives  have  not tried to  put pressure  on  their 
members  to contract for  supplies  of co-operatively 
produced  feed  as  part of  an  integration package.  Feed 
contracts  are effectively limited to short  term contracts 
for  a  season. 
The  two  most  interesting fields  of development  in 
vertical integration are  the  poultry industry  and 
horticulture.  In  the  former  competition between co-
operatives  and  the  private trade is at its strongest. 
Broiler production,  amounting  to  some  60  mn.  birds  a 
year,  is entirely on  contract with  processing plants, 
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of which  five  are co-operative,  marketing  jointly with 
control of  some  45  per cent of output.  There  are  over 
thirty privately owned  plants,  many  of which  are quite 
small.  All of these market individually with  the 
exception of three controlled by the largest private feed 
company  in Denmark.  This  company,  whose  output  amounts 
to  about one-fifth of total broiler production,  contracts 
with its producers  for  feed,  chicks,  and  technical  assistance. 
Credit is available  for  purchases  of feed  and  housing. 
It has  been  drawn  into ownership  integration through  the 
need  to  increase  throughput  for  one  of its plants,  located 
on  one  of the  islands.  It is general practice for  producers 
to be  paid  a  small  premium  for regular deliveries  which 
acts  as  an  inducement  to  abide by the contracts. 
The  co-operative share of egg  marketing  is rather 
larger  - about  55  per cent.  Co-operatives currently 
control  seven  packing  stations.  The  private trade 
consists of one  large company  and  a  number  of small  packing 
stations.  Contracts  are usually for  six months  or  a  year, 
but  they can be  extended  to  as  much  as  three years.  There 
is  a  small  amount  of ownership integration by private  feed 
interests  which  control  some  of the  packing stations. 
Some  contracts certain  a  minimum  price linked to  the  feed 
price,  the  former  being set well  below the  anticipated 
market price.  Integration arrangements  for  supplies of 
chicks  are yet to be  established on  any scale.  In  some 
parts of Denmark  either co-operative or private packing 
stations enjoy  an  element of local monopoly,  but in most 
of the  country there is active competition for  supplies. 
In  Denmark  the  use of contracts  in horticultural 
marketing  on  any  scale began  about  five years  ago,  whPn 
a  Special  Products  Committee  was  set up by the Agricultural 
Council.  This  organisation,  working  through  a  number  of 
associations,  began by obtaining contracts  from  large buyers, such  as  supermarkets,  and  then finding  a  sufficient number 
of producers  capable of meeting  the  requirements  of these 
contracts.  The  scheme  has  made  rapid progress.  About 
half the  total acreage  devoted to horticultural production 
in  Denmark  is now  marketed  on contract.  The  largest 
single activity is in peas,  where  all producers  are  joined 
together  in  a  group contract which  provides  for  the  supply 
of seeds  and harvesting machinery by  the  processing  industry. 
Prices  are established annually by negotiation.  Contracts 
for vegetables  are  normally on  an  annual basis,  though 
five  year contracts  have  been made  with cucumber  growers 
in order  to  justify the  investment in a  special processing 
plant. 
Apart  from  the  poultry industry the private sector is 
concerned with  two  main  products  relevant to vertical 
integration.  The  private bacon factories  which  operate 
mainly in  some  regions of Jutland are responsible  for  abou~ 
10  per cent of production.  They  normally  do  not use· 
contracts  with  farmers  to ensure  supplies.  By  contrast 
the  private dairies,  which control  about  10  - 15  per cent 
of supplies,  normally operate under  annual  contracts  witi1 
dairy farmers,  though  sometimes  the contracts run  for  three 
to  five  years.  Prices paid are closely related to  those 
quoted by  the co-operative dairies.  Usually contracts 
give  farmers  the right to claim the return of  a  certain 
percentage of skimmed  milk  for  feeding. 
Vertical integration is strongly established in 
Danish  agriculture mostly on  the basis of marketing 
contracts or understandings,  often unwritten,  between 
co-operatives  and  their members.  Ownership  integration 
by interests outside  farming  is effectively confined to 
two  cases,  a  feed  company  with broiler interests  and  a 
retailing organisation which  owns  egg  packing  stations. 
Without  a  disciplined marketing  system Danish  farming, 
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which  relies  on  exports  for  the  disposal  of about  two-thirds 
of  total production,  could hardly have  survived the  last 
decade  when  the  country has  been heavily disadvantaged in 
the  important  EEC  market.  In this respect  Denmark  differs 
from,  for  example,  its neighbour  Norway,  where  contract 
production is also  strongly established for  eggs,  broilers, 
pigs  and veal,  and co-operatives  are  likewise  important 
in all the  main  branches  of agricultural marketing.  But 
in Norway  the role of  the co-operatives is essentially 
defensive,  part of  a  market  support  system based  on  high 
tariff barriers  and  other  import controls,  a  policy assisted 
through  the  market regulation work  of the co-operatives. 
By  contrast,  integration arrangements  in  Denmark  are 
essentially related to the export  trade  and its requirements. 
The  rich diversity of  farming  and  the  marketing of 
farm  products  in France  makes it difficult to  provide 
any  satisfactory summary  of the  situation in that country 
so  far·as vertical integration is concerned.  Grain 
should  perhaps  be  considered first,  since France  is much 
Lhe  most  important grain producer  in the  Community. 
As  is  well-known,  the  French co-operatives  play  an  impori:ant 
rule  in the  collection,  storage  and  first marketing of all 
gr-c~.ins,  but particularly of wheat,  for  which  they control 
,Jbout  80  per cent of  the  "collecte".  To  date,  however, 
they  have  not integrated  forward  to  any  significant extent 
into  the  milling industry.  Only  about  4  per cent of 
French milling capacity is under  the  control of the 
co-operatives,  and  integration further  forwards  into 
second  processing  (e.g. biscuits)  has  been negligible. 
TI1e  use  of contracts  is  limited to  durum  wheat  and 
brewing barley.  Contracts  for  the  latter,  which  date 
back  to  1931,  now cover  about  30  per cent of total 
supplies.  Clauses  in the contracts  deal  with  the 
quality and  condition of the  grain  (humidity,  germination, 
colibration,  etc.)  and  lay dvwn  the conditions  for  delivery. There  are  no  price  guarantees,  prices  paid  to  farmers 
being related to  standard market rates,  plus  special 
bonuses  granted for  brewing barleys  fixed  each year  in 
relation to  foreseeable  supply  and  demand. 
It could be  argued that these  contracts  do  not  improve  the 
economic  power  of the  growers,  partly because the contracts 
are  pl'aced with individual  farmers,  the mal.tsters preferring the 
bigger producers,  and partly because the obligations placed by the 
contracts on  farmers  are heavier than those borne by the b~ers. 
There  is  an  extensive  degree  of vertical integration 
in  the  production of eggs  and broilers in France.  About 
20  per cent of all eggs  marketed come  from  organisations 
in which  some  form  of ownership  integration exists,  eith<'-:r 
from  farms  which  have  integrated into packing  and  sale 
of  eggs  or  from  farms  with  integrated supplies  of feeds. 
The  feed  industry itself has  some  direct interest in egg 
p~oduction, but there  is  some  recent evidence  that there 
1lc1:3  been  a  withdrawal  from  this  type  of ownership  integrn.t:"i.on. 
Con-tracts  which  seem  to  control 
Game  80  per cent of farming's  vertical integration links 
wi. tl1  industry in this  sector,  can  include  an  element  of 
~Jt.Fn·r-lntee  to  the  farmer  either  through  price  guarantees 
or  jn  terms  of remuneration per bird.  Contracts  with 
pcicc  guarantees  often provide  for  a  minimum  price  paid 
in  the  form  of  an  advanced  payment.  A  further  al  ternativ~-~ 
to  contracts with  guarantees  and  the  ordinary delivery 
contracts  are  "made-to-measure" contracts,  but these  are 
relatively rare.  In  a  few  cases  the  whole  of the 
commercial  risk is borne  by  the  integrator.  In  the 
rapidly expanding broiler industry  (about  90  per  cent of 
production is industrial)  contracts  predominate,  mostly 
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initiated by  the  poultry slaughtering plant.  The  feed 
industry has  taken  an  active interest in integration 
arrangements,  poultry feed  amounting  to  14  per cent of 
total  feed  sales.  There  are  a  number  of examples  of 
participation in this  sector in France.  Normally  the 
initiative has  come  from  the co-operatives but there 
have  also been  some  cases of private  firms  gaining control 
of co-operatives  or  SICA's.  On  the  subject of links 
between broiler producers  and  "outside" interests, 
it is said that  the  poultry meat  producers 
know  the  limitations of  a  production  system based on  n 
contractual  economy.  But participation in operations 
downwards  is not linked solely to  a  financial  contribution. 
It also  depends,  especially in the  long  term,  on  the 
commercial  strategy and  management  policy employed  in  the 
firm. 
Perhaps  the  most  interesting development  in the  field 
of vertical integration in France  has  been in the 
commercial  production of veal calves,  an  industry only 
about  ten years old.  Feed manufacturers  became  deeply 
involved  in this business  initially because  of  the  need 
to  improve  the  supplies  of week-old calves  and  subsequ(-~nl:ly 
in order  to  take part in the  marketing  of the  fattened 
calf,  the  latter being  largely necessary in order  to 
secure  their financial  stake  in the undertakings.  The 
author  of the French report estimates  that production 
without written contract is limited to  15  - 20  per cent 
of total production of veal calves,  and  that private  feed 
manufacturers control  about  three quarters of production. 
In  a  typical contract the  farmer  undertakes  to buy all his 
dried milk  from  the  manufacturer  and  agrees  to conform 
to certain technical  requirements.  The  manufacturer 
supplies  the calves  and  feed,  financing  their cost,  and 
takes  charge  of the marketing.  Occasionally there is 
some  guarantee element in the  price stipulation in the contract,  but normally the  farmer  is guaranteed  an outlet, 
but not  a  fixed price.  Consequently he  has  to bear  the 
market risk as  well  as  the  whole  of the  production risk, 
which  is still quite  severe.  The  main benefits of 
contracting therefore  for  the  farmer  are  finance  and 
technical  assistance,  apart  from  the  advantage  mention~d 
earlier of securing  guaranteed supplies of the  week-old 
calves. 
Vertical integration arrangements  are  important for 
a  number  of  farm  products  in France  including wine,  a 
number  of industrial fruits  and vegetables,  potatoes, 
tomatoes  and  milk  products. 
For  the  purposes  of this chapter comment will be  confined 
to  the  pig industry,  which  is of particular interest in 
view of the  important role  taken in vertical integration 
by  government organisations.  Vertical  integration in the 
pig  industry in France really dates from  1963  corresponding 
with  the over-production crisis at that time  in the  feed 
industry.  As  a  consequence of this situation manufacturers 
of  feeds  became  concerned to contract for  supply of their 
products  to pig  farmers,  and  then extended their interests 
to  the  supply of other  inputs  (weaner  pigs,  buildings, 
and veterinary services).  They  thus  became  involved in 
granting credit to their customers,  and  hence  moved  into 
the marketing of the  pigs  in order  to protect their 
financial  stake.  In this process  they encountered certQin 
·-imp or  tctnt difficulties,  including resistance  from  established 
lllcirketing  organisations,  and  statutory requirements  in 
some  areas  for  the use  of municipal  slaughterhouses  for 
the  slaughter of pigs.  A complicated market  situation 
has  therefore  developed in which  a  number  of interests 
are occasionally involved,  including  slaughterhouses, 
breeders  and  the  feed manufacturers  themselves.  In 
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marketing contracts  a  number  of different methods  are used 
for  fixing prices,  including  payment  on  the basis of  a 
fixed  sale price,  payment  on  the basis of market  prices 
with  a  guarantee,  etc.  An  interesting feature  of the 
situation in France  is that the  pigmeat processing 
industries  have  to  date  taken  a  very limited part in 
contractual  arrangements. 
The  reaaons  for this include the  inf~uence of 
municipal  slaughterhouses,  the relatively small  demand 
for  fresh  pork in France,  and  the  structure of the 
processing  industry itself.  Changes  currently taking 
place  in the  processing  industry will be  likely,  however, 
to  lead to  a  growth  in contractual  arrangements  stimulated 
by  the  need  to  secure regular supplies of reliable qualities 
of pigmeat. 
Attempts  by  the  French  government  to  influence or control 
relationships between  farmers,  merchants  and  industrial 
interests by collective  agreements  or  other means  go  back 
more  than  a  generation.  As  long  ago  as  1936  a  draft Bill 
on  this  subject was  adopted by  the  National  Assembly,  but 
failed before  the  Senate.  Further legislation was  attempted 
jn  1960  and  1962.  In  19641a Law  was  passed  designed to 
establish  a  base  for  model  contracts in agriculture,  to 
prevent producers  becoming  "squeezed"  by integration 
arrangements,  and  to promote collective contracts  in 
agriculture.  It is not,  however,  only by legislation 
that the  French  government  has  sought  to  intervene  in 
vertical integration.  For  instance  in the pig  sector 
several  grants  are  available  to  promote  group  activity, 
mostly channelled  through  FORMA  and its Plan  for  improving 
the  market value of pigmeat.  Financial  assistance is 
available  to  farmers  who  are  members  of groups  to assist 
them  in obtaining  aid for building investments,  for  hygiene 
operations,  and  for  the  salaries of technicians  attached 
to groups.  As  a  consequence  of this  assistance  there 
1.  Referred  to  in  the  Council  of Europe's Report  on 
contract  farming  and vertical integration in 
European  agriculture,  January  1973 has  been  a  large increase in the  amount  of group  activity 
in  pig marketing,  which  now  controls  more  than  a  third of 
the  total  pig  market.  Some  of these  groups  are  selling 
on  contract,  but may  have  encountered  the  difficulty 
mentioned earlier of finding  suitable  partners  among  the 
processing industries  who  are  interested in making  contracts. 
Looking  to  the  future  the  author  of the  French  study believes 
thai: it may  be  expected that the movement  on  the part of 
the co-operatives  and  production organisations  in general 
to  integrate slaughtering will continue  in the  coming 
years. 
Perhaps  the  most  remarkable  feature  about  the  situation 
in  Germany  is  the  comparative  lack of the  use  of contracts 
in egg  marketing.  No  less  than  65  per cent of total 
production is sold without contracts.  This  is explained 
by  the  problems  of  "self-marketing",  i.e. direct sales by 
farmers  to  consumers  or retailers,  a  practice still common 
in  the  Federal  Republic.  With  this  method of marketing,  fcJ cu1ers 
may  find  themselves  with higher costs,  but these  are  often  rllo.re 
than offset by the  higher realisations  they obtain  as  a 
result of consumers  being  prepared to  pay  more  for  what 
they believe  to be  a  fresher  product  and  the  advantage 
of  less  fluctuation  in prices.  Only  about  a  quarter of 
all eggs  pass  through  commercial  packing  stations.  There  J ..  c; 
currently  a  tendency  in Germany  towards  increased concentration 
in  i:he  egg  industry and  more  producers  are  tending  to  pack 
their eggs  on  their  own  farms.  It is,  however,  not 
expected that there will be  much  change  in the  general 
pattern of egg  marketing.  In his report on  the  situation 
in Germany  Dr.  von  Alvensleben  draws  attention to  the  fact 
that egg  production is characterised by  average  production 
risks,  but high  market  and  investment risks.  In 
contracts  made  between  the  packing  stations  and 
producers  some  attempts  have  been  made  at risk-sharing. 
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There  are  also cases  of  "package"  arrangements  which  may 
include  the  supply of  farm buildings.  Some  eggs  are 
produced on  commission  arrangements,  whereby  the  farmer 
carries  none  of the risks.  This  is  a  system of 
production which  is generally frowned  on,  though  presumably 
it must  fulfil  a  function  for  some  types of farmers. 
Vertical  integration links  are of very little 
importance  in the beef sector.  Calf  schemes  for  veal 
production have  developed  more  importance  in Germany  as 
feed  has  become  a  more  significant part of production 
costs.  Commission contracts  are  more  common  in veal 
production.  Dairy  farmers  in Germany  who  are  members 
of co-operatives  are  obliged to  make  deliveries  to  them, 
but this is not considered to be  a  contract of significance 
to  the  development  of vertical integration.  Likewise 
claiL'Y  farmers  delivering to private dairies  have  a  form 
of contract of  a  similar nature,  though  this  may  often 
be  unwritten.  The  dairy farmer  admittedly  lacks -alternative 
outlets  for his  produce,  but equally the  dairy itself can 
hEtrdly  refuse  a  farmer's  supplies.  In many  cases the two  are therefore 
effectively bound  together  whether  a  contract exists or 
not. 
i\ b o u t  1_ 5  per  c en  t 
sold on contracts. 
of all pigs  marketed in Germany  are 
These  can  take various  forms.  The 
objectives  to be  achieved  include  the  provision of credit 
to  the  farmer  by feed  manufacturers,  the  securing of 
outlets by  farmers  and of supplies by the  processing 
industries,  and  the  improvement  of quality of product. 
Prices  determined under contracts can be either fixed or 
derived  from  a  market  price or based  on  an  average. 
There  are  few  examples  of participation,  but Dr.  Von 
Alvensleben quotes  the  example  of Uniporc.  Other interesting examples  of participation are  provided by 
Nordmark-Ei  in egg  production  and  the  well-known case 
of the co-operative undertaking Unterland in fruits  and 
vegetables.  There  is also  some  evidence of joint ventures 
in starch manufacture. 
Finally,  it is worth  noting  the  tendencies  in the  use 
of contracts  in the  marketing of quality grains  (quality 
wheat,  brewing barley)  in Germany.  More  than  100  producer 
groups  have  been  founded  for  this  purpose  on  the basis of 
the  "Marktstrukturgesetz".  But their ties to  the  next 
market  stages  are  in most cases  informal  and not very 
intensive.  Real  contract production of quality wheat 
is estimated at about  60,000  tons  a  year.  Since  1971  there 
has  been  a  considerable  increase in the  use of contracts  for 
brewing barley.  By  1972  about  25  per cent of the  German 
production  was  already based  on contracts.  But  market 
prices fell below the contract prices  and  this caused  a 
severe cut-back in contract production in 1973.  The  further 
development  of the  use  of contracts in grain marketing in 
Germany  appears uncertain. 
There  is very little evidence of vertical integration 
links  in agriculture in Ireland.  This  slow  development 
may  be  partly due  to  the state of agricultural co-operation 
which,  until recently,  was  virtually confined to  the  dairy 
industry.  This  is still by  far  the  most  important co-
operative activity,  though  diversification has  occurred 
in the direction of horticultural marketing,  feed 
manufacture  and  livestock  and  meat marketing.  Vertical 
inte~ration  ~s  now  beginning  to affect the marketing of 
livestock and  meat  and  meat  products,  which  together 
constitute  a  major  part of Ireland's agricultural exports 
The  most  significant development  in this field occurred 
about  three years  ago  when  the  largest meat business  in 
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Dublin,  with  a  sizeable export trade,  was  acquired by  a 
large  livestock co-operative based  in the  south.  Brewing 
bnrley is  sometimes  sold  on contract.  The  only other 
:farm  products  for  which  contracts  are  used  on  any  scale 
in Ireland are vegetables  for  canning  and  freezing. 
It is likely that integration will  develop  more  rapidly 
in  future  as  Ireland expands  its markets  within  the 
Community,  but at present both ownership vertical 
integration  and  the  use  of contracts  play very little 
part in agricultural marketing. 
'The  general  impression conveyed by  the report  from 
_ltaly_  is that there  are  especially large variations  in 
t:.he  degree  of vertical  integration in Italian agriculture, 
<Jnd  this  is confirmed by  the  statistics  shown  in the 
Appendix  to  this report.  It is evidently impossible 
to  generalise  about  what  type  of contract is  the  most 
favourable  for  the  three  most  interested parties,  farmers, 
pcocessors  and  consumers,  but Prof.  Ruosi believes  that  d~L 
contracts  have  so  far  been  substantially positive or at 
lcJst not  negative  for  all three  groups.  In Italy it 
c0nnot be  said with certainty that production  under 
cont:ro.cts  (almost exclusively delivery contracts)  has 
gre0tly affected  in absolute  terms  the balance between 
ck:mand  and  supply of production.  However,  given  the 
illmost  total disorganisation which  evidently reigned in 
mcJckets  for  many  products before  the  spread of production 
under contract this  form  of production can only,  in the 
author's  opinion,  have  made  a  positive contribution in 
this field. 
One  of the  leading oddities of the  agricultural 
situation in Italy is  the  absence  of contracts  in pig 
production.  There  are  a  few  very large  pig units  in 
Italy, __ including  one  q_wneq  :Qy __ the  leading Italian grain importer,  but contracts  are virtually non-existent. 
The  report  from  Italy identifies only one  example  and 
that in  a  region of the  Mezzogiorno  which  is considered 
to be  generally unsuitable  for  this  type  of  farming. 
Analysing  the  reasons  for  the  lack of contract production 
the  author  draws  attention to  three causes.  First,  in 
his  view,  for  pigs  (as  apparently also for  milk)  the 
requirements  of product uniformity  are  less stringent  t:11un 
is  the case  for  other  agricultural  products.  Secondly, 
the  processors  prefer consistently to exploit the 
disorganisation  and  lack of transparency of the  market 
which  enables  them  to  overpower  their agricultural  partner';:-.; 
who  would,  without  doubt,  become  far  stronger  through 
contract production.  And,  thirdly,  the exigencies  of 
technical  assistance,  financing  and  commercial  outlets 
are  very  much  less noticeable  in this  sector. 
A  good  example  of  integration which  has  been rapidl'f 
c1pplied  to  a  product  in  a  country where  otherwise  inter_lt:·(-, l: i_on 
is  uncommon  is provided by  the  tomato  industry in Italy. 
Contracts  are  widely used  to  lay down  the  specific  te.rm:_) 
for  deliveries of certain quantities  from  defined  are0~ 
at prices  fixed  in  advance.  The  processing partner  js 
interested in  the  technical  aspects  of production  to  tiv' 
extc::nt  of influencing  the  type  of seeds  used,  but in oU i',  ~-· 
respects  there  is little interference in production by  i::l1•_' 
integrator.  The  contract lays  down  terms  for  delivery 
of the  product  and  specifies quantity  and quality,  thouc_1i 1 
so  far  as  the  latter is concerned  the  specifications  are 
usually  worded  so  that some  latitude is left open  for 
discussion between  the  parties.  Prices  are  predeterm.LrH_'·( 1 
for  the  whole  season  on  the basis either of  a  fixed  prier', 
or  a  minimum  price,  or  a  formula constituting  a  comprowj .st:, 
between  the  two.  Payment  is usually by  instalment  dur:i r1c; 
or  after delivery of the  tomatoes  and  some  processors  mr1."k.r'~ 
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advance  payments.  It appears  that there  are still some 
problems  to be  overcome  in relation to contracts  for 
tomatoes  in Italy,  notably in the  methods  used  to settle 
disputes  over quality,  but in general  the contracting 
system has  introduced stability into the  market  and 
improved  the quality of the  product.  Indeed it can be 
argued  that the  production of tomatoes,  a  highly perishable 
product,  could hardly have  developed  on  the  present scale 
without the  security of these contracts.  Perhaps  the 
least satisfactory aspect is that negotiation over prices 
is often between  individual  farmers  and  processors.  There 
has  been very little progress  in the establishment of 
bargaining  strength on  the  producers'  side. 
So  far  as  producer  organisations  are concerned Prof 
Ruosi  considers  that the  growth  of co-operation has  not 
l1ad  the  slightest effect either on  consumption  and  consum0r 
prices  or  on  farmers  who  are not  members  of co-operatives, 
and  who  have  not  only remained  unharmed by their  volunt~ry 
exclusion  from  the  co-operatives,  but,  on  the  contrary,  may 
have  actually profited  from it.  In Italy farmers  who  <:1.rc~ 
not  members  of co-operatives can still benefit indirectly 
from  the  marketing  activities of the co-operative  movement, 
as  well  as  obtaining better conditions offered  them  by  the 
pcocessing  industry,  and  thus. securing  an  increasing 
p.r::oportion  of the market  and  making  life difficult for  t.lte 
co-operatives  themselves. 
For  G¥@-l;'  a  c--entury vertical  integration has- -a-ff-ected 
a~J.ciculture in the  Netherlands,  where  co-operative  activil:y 
is  pac t:icularly strongly entrenched.  It  could  be  argued 
that co-operation within agricultural co-operatives  shoulcJ 
be  classed  as  participation on  the  grounds  that farmers 
jointly participate in the capital of the co-operatives 
and  also  in their management.  Consequently  emphasis  should 
be put  on the development  of the  co-operatives and  how  they operate in the various  sectors of marketing 
and.  processing  farm  products.  In  arguing that membership 
of  a  co-operative  and  the  use of its services,  notably 
for  marketing,  constitutes  an  important  element of vertical 
integration,  such a  view is not  commonly  accepted.  For 
instance,  the  author of  the  German  study is concerned with 
the  activities of co-operative organisations  forwards,  but 
does  not treat the  link between  farmers  and  their 
co-operatives  as  representing in itself an  element of 
integration deserving of any  special  attention.  Most 
probably it would be  generally accepted that it is rather 
easy to  exaggerate  the  dependence  of  large-scale co-
operatives  on capital  provided by their members,  as 
against that drawn  from  the retained profits of these 
organisations  and  outside financial  sources  including 
the co-operative banks.  Likewise,  in practice the 
control of the running  of co-operatives is nowadays  more 
likely to reside with their professional  managers  than 
with  farmer  members.  Due  to  the  complexities of modern 
agri-business  the  latter often have  to  accede  in decisions 
arrived at by managers  of their co-operatives rather  than 
participate in them.  In the Netherlands,  as  elsewhere, 
co-operatives  must be  run  for  the benefit of their members, 
but frequently  the  degree  of practical participation by 
individual  members  is necessarily very slight.  While  the 
member-co-operative  link must be  kept in proportion in any 
discussion of vertical integration,  the overall responsibilities 
of co-operative organisations  in these  developments  are very 
considerable,  a  point which  is re-emphasised in Chapter 
vrr of this report. 
An  example  of this point is provided by the situation 
in the beet-crushing industry in the  Netherlands. 
An  interesting  developm~  eenstitutes 
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theSuiker  Unie,1 •  the co-operatively owned  refineries, 
which  now  control  about  63  per cent of Dutch  sugar  production. 
While  the contracts used by  Suiker Unie  are  much  the  same 
as  those  of  CSM,  the  private undertak:;ing  with six factories, 
the  former  are  regarded  as  constituting participation on 
the  grounds. that part of its capital is subscribed by 
members  and,  at least theoretically,  they have  ultimate 
control of management.  But  the  practical  differenc~ for 
farmers  of dealing with  Suiker  Unie  or  CSM  must  be  regarded 
as  very slight.  Another  example  is offered by  the  potato 
starch industry.  Here  there  are evidently two  forms  of 
participation,  through  a  co-operative  (AVEBE  with  about 
7, 000  mernbers)  and  through  farmers  buying  shares  in  a 
limited liability company set up  for  this  purpose.  In 
neither case  does  participation appear  in practice  to be 
of  any real  significance.  In  the  Netherlands  contracts 
now  affect potatoes  marketed  for  human  consumption,  as 
to  about  10  - 15  per cent of total production.  One 
:feal:ure  of  the contracting  system is that contracts  with both 
t~1e  pr-ivate  trade  and  the  co-operatives  include  "pooling", 
but  it  could  be  argued  that  the  private 
concracts  must  be  distinguished  from  those  of  the  co-
operatives  since  they  do  not fall  under  the  heading of 
"participation".  A  stronger  development  of contracting 
has  occurred in  the  i~dustrial sector  (potato chips,  etc.). 
Most  of the  processing  industry is in private hands,  but the 
co-operatives  also  have  a  stake  in the industry including 
minority interests in  the  private  trade.  Contracts  are 
of  four  kinds:  ordinary sale contracts  at current prices, 
contracts  for  one  or  more  years  at fixed  prices,  minimum 
price contracts with profit sharing,  and  price pooling 
contracts. 
1.  Suiker Unie  has  shares  in  a  number  of integrated 
activities such  as  distilling,  waste  processing, 
pulp  drying  and confectionery manufacture. As  in Germany  there  has  been  a  development recently 
in  the  marketing  on contract of brewing barley in the 
Netherlands,  the difficulties noted in the reports being 
much  the  same  in both countries.  Centralised grain marketing 
by  producers'  organisations  has  developed  strongly in the 
Netherlands.  The  system,  which  includes  pooling  arrangements, 
is  an  important element of co-operative activity in the 
Netherlands.  Another  is slaughtering of pigs  and  marketing 
of carcasses by co-operative  slaughterhouses. 
Production under  contract of pigs  began  about  20  - 25 
years  ago,  the first contracts being between  farmers  and 
the  private  processing  plants.  The  latter were  interested 
in securing regular  supplies  of quality products,  and  in 
maintaining  throughput  for  their plants.  Cattle dealers 
and  feed  manufacturers  now  take  part in these contracts 
along  with  farmers  and  slaughterhouses.  The  contractual 
arrangements  are  usually co-ordinated by  the  feed 
manufacturers,  but slaughterhouses  can also  take  the 
initiative.  In this connection it is also worth  noting 
the  interests of  firms  like  Koudijs,  Homburg  and  Unilever 
in  pig breeding activities.  Several  different types  of 
contracts  are used  for  pig  fattening.  Commission 
contracts  account  for  no  less  than  32  per cent of all 
contracts.  Under  this  system the  farmer  takes  care of 
the  pigs but they  do  not become  his  property.  In exchange 
for  his  work  the  farmer  receives  a  regular remuneration either 
as  a  sum  for  the  use  of his buildings  or  in relation to 
numbers  of animals,  or  a  combination of the  two.  Often 
the  agreement  provides  for  the  farmer,  if he  obtains 
favourable  results,  to receive  a  share of profits. 
Fixed price contracts  are relatively uncommon,  but contracts 
with  a  guaranteed minimum-price  account  for  21  per cent of 
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total  pigs  produced  under contract.  Finally,  there is 
the  simple  system whereby  the  farmer  undertakes  to deliver 
a  certain number  of pigs  to  a  specific buyer  and  prices 
are  determined  on  the basis of market prices  on  the  date 
of delivery.  This  system  accounts  for  46  per cent of 
pigs  marketed under  contract.  Profit and risk sharing 
schemes  have  been well  developed in the Netherlands  and 
in this  the co-operatives  have  taken  a  leading part. 
Finally,  one  should note  the  integration  arrangeme~ts 
that have  been  made  for  the broiler industry in the 
Netherlands,  which  have  served  as  a  model  also  for  the 
egg  industry.  In  these  arrangements,  which  are 
associated with  the co-operative brand  name  FRI-KI,  ver  l: -Leal 
integration revolves  round  the  processing plant but other 
interests,  feed  manufacturers,  hatcheries,  etc.,  are 
associated with  the  producers  in contrGcts.  The  express0d 
objectives of this  system are,  first,  the  spread of marker:: 
risk,  so  that when  prices  fluctuate  considerably all  s CufJ('S 
of  production get  a  reasonable  share  in the  losses  or  the 
profits;  secondly,  the  adjustment of capacities of the 
participants,  feed,  hatching  eggs,  etc:  thirdly,  the 
improvement of the quality and  uniformity of the  end 
product  so  that all partners  of the  scheme benefit;  and, 
fourthly,  the  lowering of production costs at all stages 
by  the best possible co-ordination. 
X  X  X  X  X 
The  reports  from  the member  9ountries  show 
that there  are considerable differences  in tne  extent of 
the  development of vertical integration between  the  varlous 
countries  as  well  as  between different farm  products. 
At  one  end of the  scale is the  Netherlands  where  vertical 
integration  (at least if the broadest use  of the  term is 
adopted)  has  been  applied  to all the  main branches  of 
agriculture  and horticulture,  and  at the  other end is Italy, where  it is  much  less  common,  being effectively limited 
to  a.  small  number  of  specialised products •  The  basic 
.  ceasons  for  these  differences  have  already been  indical:c:d. 
Vertical  integration is closely associated with  a 
sophist::icated agricultural  industry capable of supplyinq 
pr-oducts  to  a  specified quality.  The  level of  technic<'-11 
proficiency in agriculture varies  greatly both between 
countries  and  within  individual countries.  Likewise, 
there  are  important differences between regions  of the 
Corrununity  in the  standards  and  s·tructure  of  food retail  inc.:; 
''nd  of  the  various  sectors of the  food  industry.  It "i.s 
processors  of agricultural  products  into mass-produced, 
p;:1ck<1ged  and usually branded  foods  that are  particularly 
interested in securing their supplies  through vertical 
integration. 
'.l'he  more  concentrated  and  sophisticated is  a  country';; 
food  industry the  more it is likely to wish  to  make 
integcation arrangements  for its supplies.  Likewise 
the  effects  on  integration of the  structure of  the 
fcedingstuffs  industry must  be  re-emphasised.  A 
concentrated feed  industry,  such  as  exists  in Britain  Ol' 
the  Netherlands,  is more  likely to  wish  to  secure its 
outlets  through contracts or  ownership vertical  integru:~-;l)ii' 
lhan  a  more  fragmented  industry such  as  is  found  in  Irc<L·,il-l 
or  Italy. 
As  earlier chapters  have  shown,some  products  e1re 
more  suitable  for vertical integration than others. 
A  product susceptible  to  severe  market risks is more 
likely to be  the  subject of vertical integration than 
one  characterised by stable prices.  Grain  which  can 
be  easily and  cheaply stored is less liable to verticc.;_l 
integration than broilers or young  pigs.  Products,  suc·J i 
as  hops  or  sugar beet,  for  which  few  market outlets  exi:·::; i 
are very susceptible  to vertical integration.  A  numbe.c 
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of  ol:hcr criteria for  products  u_nd  their liability to 
vectic~l integration could be  given,  including  the 
de(;;.cc=;e  o£  capital  :Lntensi  ty of  the  farm  business  requirE::c1 
-r:o.r.  E::>conomic  production  (see  Appendix ). 
Snmmarising  the  likely developments  for  the 
flil:ure  i c  seems  likely  th;:J..t  the  pace  of change  will 
,l(~celc.cate,  that  average  technical  proficiency in  farrn LlH:J 
vvill  improve  rapidly  1  that food  retailing will continue 
Lo  rnov(~  towards  greater use  of self-ser\rice  and  superm.~~LL:r,  C. 
(:radinq,  and  that throughout  the  Community  the  food 
indus try will become  more  concentrated  and  more  sophis l:i<>l :~.c~d; 
dnd  that these  changes  will give rise to  a  greater use  o.L 
vertical  integration arrangements.  In assessing  the 
t·c:.:;_~-;;ons  for  differences  in the  state of vertical  in·te(_jrt-J ;-::  i_on 
:t n  ·cnc  EEC  account  must  also be  taken of governmental 
';C: \.:-Lon  in this  field.  rrhe  effects of legislation in 
l.-h:Ls  field  tend  to be  indirect.  For  example  in Germany, 
U<o  l'''lilk  and  Fat Act  has  compelled dairy farmers  to  mdkr: 
d\'1 iveries  of milk  to  dLliri.es  with  the  consequence  thai.:: 
1hJ  r:-or;1lal  contracts  are required.  The  Market  Struc  L:ucc' 
/\._·t  lt.=1s  stimulated the  development  of disciplined  prodtH_~r:l 
(;i.·uu;.•s.  The  Potato  Spirits Monopoly  Act  has  affected 
:)o  ~c1l.o  rnarketing  for  distilling purposes •  And  legislrt  L·i_(![L 
• llld  \J cdn t  aid  for  slaughterhouses  has  changed  the  patt<'rll 
~,,r  Jive  stock marketing  wi  tr1  indirect effects  on  vertic;1:i. 
_i_ntegra tion.  It must,  however,  be  noted  in this 
ronnection  that  the  EEC  country most  free  from  direct 
~;overnment involvement  in agricultural marketing,  the 
Netherlands,  has  witnessed  a  strong  development  of variou:; 
forms  of vertical integration. 
A  very important cause  of the  differences  in the 
state of vertical integration in the  Community  lies in 
the  structure  and  efficiency of producers'  organisatio1lS. 
To  take  part successfully in vertical integration co-operatives  must  possess  all  the  obvious  characteristics 
of  a  successful business,  but in particular they must  be 
able  to  depend  on  obtaining  la!'ge  and  preferably certain 
quantities of their members'  products  for  marketing. 
This can best be  done  through  the  use  of contracts between 
members  and  their co-operative,  but it can  also be  achieved 
through  long-established traditional  loyalty or  the  sheer 
mRrket  strength of the organisation.  To  the  extent that 
co-operatives  are  poorly managed,  or  divided by rivalry, 
or  lack disciplined membership,  they  are  less well  placed 
to  take  part effectively in vertical integration. 
Fortunately the  structure of agricultural co-operaLion 
in  the  member  countries  is by  no  means  fixed  and  immutabl(' .. 
Change  is being  forced  on  co-operatives by  the  pressure  of 
the  younger  generation of farmers  dissatisfied with  ant:iqll<·tted 
n1ethods  and  less  preoccupied by  the  need  to perpetuate  in 
commercial  life the  divisions  of religious  and  political 
CJ.ffiliations  which  have  previously kept rival co-operative:) 
immune  from  economic  pressures,  leading to mergers  betwc~c>ll 
organisations  that are  no  longer viable  on  their  own.  Ch. 1nge 
can  also be  accelerated by  administrative  action.  A  gcxJci 
example  of this is  the  stimulus  to  more  rigorous  self-
examination  on  the  part of co-operatives  which  has  been 
provided by  the  grant  aid offered to  disciplined groups, 
and  the  need  to  take  account of,  and  to  come  to  terms 
with,  these  new organisations. 
Attitudes  to vertical integration  among  farmers  in 
the  Community  also  appear  to be  changing.  Until recen  t~Jy 
suspicion of contracts  seemed  to be  widespread  and  feats 
were  expressed that the  experiences  of contracted farmers 
in North  America might  be  duplicated in Europe.  While 
these  fears  were  not unreasonable it would be  a  mistake  ~-:.o 
ignore  some  of the  special  features  of the  American  farmirv__1 
scene  that contributed to  the  abuses  of vertical  integrc1tion, 
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particularly the  lack of strongly established producers' 
organisations.  Many  farmers  in both  the  original  and 
new  member  countries  now  realise that there  are benefits 
to be  obtained  from vertical integration,  and  that they 
should organise  themselves  to participate in it. VII 
THE  ROLE  OF  PRODUCERS'  ORGANISATIONS 
1.  Co-operatives  and  their members 
It is evident  from  the reports  on  the state of vertical 
integration in ·the  original  EEC  member  countries  that 
co-operatives  are currently taking  an  important part in 
vertical integration in  the broad sense.  The  outstanding 
example  is  the  Netherlands,  but other  examples  of this 
activity can be  drawn  from  France  and  the  other  member 
countries.  This  chapter is concerned with  three  main 
questions:  What  can co-operatives  do  in the  interests 
of their  members  to  improve  co-ordination of  agricultura~ 
marketing;  what  is the best organisation to  achieve  these 
objectives;  and  what  are  the  main  difficulties they will 
face  in the  future  and  how  can  these be  alleviated?1 • 
The  first question contains  the  phrase  "in the  in  teres  (.r; 
of their members".  To  some  this might  appear  to be  too 
narrow  an  aim  for  the  co-operative movement.  What  about 
the  contribution that co-operation can  make  through  improvc-;ci 
marketing  to reduction in expenditure  on  market  support? 
Should  not  agricultural co-operatives  also bear  in mind  th.c 
need  to  serve  consumers  through  providing,  or  assisting  to 
provide,  high quality food  at  low  prices?  Responsible 
co-operatives  cannot  lose sight of  the  need  to fulfil 
broad  policy objectives of this kind,  and  the fact that 
l.  For  convenience  the  word  co-operative is 
used  throughout  this chapter  to  cover all 
organisations controlled by  producers  wha·tever 
their legal status,  membership rules,  etc. 
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their activities  should help to further  them is  an  import~nt 
part of their case  for  financial  support  from  governments. 
Objectives  which  lie outside  a  narrow definition of "in 
the  interests of their members",  and  indeed  which  might 
appear  in the  short run  to be contrary to  them,  cannot be 
ignored.  At  the  same  time  co-operatives can  sensibly 
concentrate their policies solely to benefit their members, 
since  in practice  they will hardly be  able  to  achieve  this 
objective  in the  long  run without  taking heed of their 
impact  on  others,  and  notably on  consumers. 
But  do  agricultural co-operatives  in fact operate  in 
the  interests of their members?  The  question is often 
asked,  not least by  members,  who  are  sometimes  inclined  to 
regard their co-operative  as  something  outside  themselves, 
especially if it is  large  and  long established.  It is 
frequently  asserted that co-operatives  develop  policies  rnore 
related to  the  aggrandisement of the  organisation or  the 
ambitions  of managers  than of  the  well-being  of members. 
This  may  sometimes  be  the case,  but it is certainly not 
sufficient grounds  for  denying  the  general role  that 
co-operatives  can play on behalf of  farmers.  Clearly 
it is up  to members  to  put right policies  they  do  not  lik:-;, 
if necessary by organising  themselves  against  the  managc,wcn1:::. 
Co-operatives  cannot be  expected  to  please  all their  meli·lfx~.~ ·;:; 
equally.  The  more  dynamic  and  forward  looking  is  a  co-
operative  the  more  it will  tread on  some  sensitive  farmer::;' 
toes.  But  at least co-operatives represent  the  only 
commercial  organisationswhich  farmers  own  and  are  in  a 
position to  influence directly so  that their  own  interests 
are constantly served. 
Undoubtedly  tensions exist within most  agricultural 
co-operatives,  both between  members  with  their differing 
needs  and  objectives  and  between  members  and  profession~l managers.  This  problem is not,  of course,  unique  to 
agricultural co-operatives.  Most businesses  suffer  from 
similar  tensions.  The  most  typical,  that between  the 
production  and  sales  departments,  can be  compared  with 
the  members'/managers'  tensions  found  in so  many 
co-operatives.  The  Boards  of Directors  of co-operatives 
have  an  important role  in reconciling  these  important 
differences,  and  particularly in interpreting to managers 
\vhat  are  the  needs  of their members. 
Co-operatives  in Western  Europe  vary greatly in size, 
function,  membership,  rules of discipline,  financial  stren(Jth, 
etc.,  but  the  main  division is between  specialised groups  c:1nd 
multi-purpose co-operatives.  Both  can  take  part in verti< :al 
integration.  The  particular interest of the  latter is  U1,:; t 
through  involvement  in both requirements  (particularly 
animal  feeds)  and  marketing  they  are  able  to initiate 
complete vertical integration schemes  in which  the  supply 
of inputs  is linked with  the  marketing of farm  produce  or, 
in collaboration with  associated processing co-operatives, 
of  processed products.  Credit can be  injected through 
financial  institutions with  which  the co-operative  has 
close  links.  The  Dutch  system is often regarded  as  a 
model  of  how co-operatives  can  function both horizontally 
and vertically in the  service of its members.  There  1s 
certainly much  to  admire  in their organisation.  But  UH' 
policy  sta  tem~nts of· the  boards  of_ the  Dutch_ CootJera tives  reveal 
that  there is  no  question of adopting  a  static approach 
to  the  most  appropriate  str_ucture  of co-operation. 
Changes  are  currently taking place,  an  illustration of 
the  danger  of attempting  to  define  the  ideal model  of  a 
co-operative. 
2.  The  structure of co-operation 
The  accummulation of meaningful  quantities of  farm 
produce,  the concentration of supplies  for  marketing 
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through  horizontal  integration,  may  involve  the creation 
of  a  pyramid structure.  This  structure,  whereby  local 
co-operatives  perform in effect  a  procurement  function 
on  behalf of  a  regional or central co-operative,  is 
particularly relevant when  the  commodity  in question is 
produced  on  a  wide  scale by  a  large  number  of farmers 
and  when  there is strong concentration of buying.  The 
best example  of this case is provided by  the organisation 
of supplies  of grain in the  Netherlands.  W~ have  p~eviously 
noted  that  the  co-operatives  have  set up  a  system 
of links between  the  local co-operatives  and  the  centre 
where  marketing  decisions  are  actually made.  The 
problem of communications  and  the  danger  of isolation of 
farmers  and  their local bodies  are  recognised,  but it is 
doubtful  whether_any satisfactory solution can ever be 
found.  In  the context of small-scale  farming  there is 
really no  choice  about  the  surrender of marketing  to 
organisations  which  may  seem remote  to  farmers  however 
much  they  attempt  to  keep  their members  in touch  with 
what  is being  done  on  their behalf.  From  the  assumption 
of marketing  powers  there  follows  a  responsibility for 
quality control  and  thus  supply control,  the exercise of 
which  will often bring co-operatives  into conflict with 
their members.  The  rationalisation of the co-operative 
dairies  in  Denmark  with its implications  for  dairy 
farmers  is  a  good  example  of  the  sort of difficulties 
involved in any re-organisation  scheme  promoted by 
co-operatives.  The  general  interests of dairy farming, 
or  any  other sector of agriculture,  can run counter  to 
the  individual interests of  some  producers  who  are 
thereby estranged  from  their co-operative. 
The  Dutch  system,  or the  pyramid structure of producer 
groups  linked to  a  union of producer  groups,  goes  some 
way- to providing  a  compromise  between-eommerci-al-necessities  and  the  desirability of retaining  a  degree 
of identification with  the co-operative organisation on 
the part of producers.  It seems  likely that the  sense 
of isolation mentioned earlier will become  more  profound. 
In  these  circumstances it becomes  all the  more  important 
that co-operatives  are  patently fulfilling  a  farming  need, 
that the  importance  of their role is recognised  and 
appreciated,  and  that co-operatives  are  seen to be  working 
effectively on  their members'  behalf,  carrying out  an 
indispensable  function  in marketing.  It is difficult 
to  lay too  much  stress  on  the  paramount  need  to  preserve 
identification of interest between  farmers  and their 
co-operatives,  even if a  pyramid structure becomes 
necessary,  and  to  avoid  the  growth  of  "we-they"  attitudes. 
A  pyramid  structure may  be  forced  on  agricultural 
co-operation by  the  pressures  of commercial  necessity. 
Its disadvantages  - notably remoteness  of members  from 
decision making  and  the  possibility of higher  administrative 
costs  - are  well  known.  Its major  weakness,  however, 
is  that it is most unlikely to be  an effective method  of 
appreciably increasing countervailing  power  and  improving 
agriculture's bargaining strength.  It is hardly possible 
to  envisage  a  pyramid structure being created to cover  the 
whole  Community  which  would effectively channel  through 
one  central organisation  a  sufficient part of total 
supplies  of  any of the major  farm  commodities  so  as  to 
be  able  to exert an  appreciable  influence  on  market 
prices.  Indeed it must  be  questionable  whether  such 
an  organisation would be  desirable  even if it were  feasible. 
The  idea of  a  co-operative colossus of this kind,  and  the 
consequent  implications  for  co-operative bureaucracy seem 
very  alarming. 
So  many  different factors  are-relevant-to  the 
structure of agricultural co-operation that it is 
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highly dangerous  to  lay  down  what  is the  most  appropriate 
form  throughout  the  Community.  Criteria for  aids  avail~bJ_e 
to co-operatives,  discussed later in this chapter,  must  t~ke 
account of this.  It would be  wrong  to enforce  a  model  of 
co-operative structure  and  activity through offering 
assistance  to co-operatives  with strict rules  over 
eligibility.  A  more  natural  growth  is  to be  preferred 
even if progress  appears  to be  slower  than  what  might be 
achieved  as  a  result of large-scale State intervention. 
3.  Market  strength through bargaining associations 
What  alternatives can be  employed if,  as  appears  to 
be  the  case,  a  large-scale  pyramid  structure is neither 
possible  nor  appropriate  for  co-operative activity for 
all agricultural commodities?  The  first point that arises 
is  whether it is necessary for  supplies  to  be  physically 
cl1annelled  through  a  pyramid  in order  to gain bargaining 
strength.  For  commodities  that are  subject to  day  to 
day  trading  the  use  of  a  marketing bottleneck has  its 
attractions,  though  even  without it co-operatives  might 
be  able  to  assist their  joint strength by increased trading 
among  themselves  and  by  a  free  exchange  of market  inform0tion. 
But  in  the  case of commodities  suitable for  contracting 
the  situation appears  different.  Since  one  of  the 
conclusions  of this report is that the  use  of contracts 
in agriculture is likely to  increase considerably,  it is 
right to  look  further  into their relevance  to bargaining 
strength. 
In  the  United States  so-called Bargaining Associations 
have  been  in existence  for  a  number  of years.  They  are 
particularly strong in fruits  and  vegetables  and  potatoes. 
With  the  active  support of the  Department of Agriculture 
they have  been set up  in order  to negotiate  on behalf of 
individuals  or  local co-operatives  about  the  terms  and conditions  and,  of course,  prices  for contracts with 
processors.  They  do  not handle  the  products either  as 
principals or  agents.  Their role is to bring together 
quantities of produce  for  the  purpose  of negotiation only. 
In other respects  local co-operatives retain their  autonomy. 
Why  has  this  system not been  employed  in Western 
Europe?  One  obvious  reason is that the  legal position 
is different so  far  as  restrictive practices  are  concerned. 
Governments  have  been reluctant to  make  available  to 
producers  such direct powers  to influence markets  without 
a  degree  of government control  which  might  largely vitiate 
them.  There  are  two  other  important reasons.  First, 
Western  Europe  has  until recently consisted of  a  number 
of  individual national  markets  for  agricultural  products. 
The  larger becomes  the  economic  community,  the  more 
relevant bargaining  associations  appear  to become.  Sf;Cl)ndly, 
account  must  be  taken of  the  fact that strong  co-operativc~s 
already exist in most  of  these countries  so ·that the  case 
for  bargaining associations  may  appear  less compelling. 
The  extension of  the  Community,  and  especially the 
inclusion of  two  countries  in which  agricultural  co-ope.r.:.-c1tion 
is  much  less  strongly established,  presents  an  opportuniLy 
for  examining  further  the  possible relevance of bargainin(J 
associations  to  a  number  of agricultural products  sui  tab  l(; 
for contracting. 
The  establishment of bargaining  associations  worki.ns1 
on  a  Community basis might require  the creation of new 
organisations or at least  a  major  transformation of 
existing bodies.  An  important role that will be 
increasingly available  to existing co-operatives is in 
participation in joint ventures.  If in the  future 
joint ventures  become  a  more  common  feature  of vertical 
integration,  co-operatives wilt have  a  major responsibilit:y 
for  initiating them,  for  securing satisfactory terms  for 
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their  members,  and  for  participating in their management. 
The  co-operatives  directly involved  are  likely to be 
local  or regional,  but central co-operatives  may  take 
part in  an  advisory  and  co-ordinating capacity. 
The  emphasis  of  the  above  discussion has  been  on 
the  function of co-operatives  and their organisation in 
relation to vertical integration.  Some  change  in role 
is ·dnticipated though  their overall  importance  is likely 
to  increase.  This  need  not  imply  that the  private 
sector will  not continue  to  make  a  significant contribution 
to  ayricultural merchanting.  It would be  a  sad  day  for 
uqriculture if it lost the  initiative and  flexibility of 
pcivate  merchants.  At  the  very least they serve 
rroducers'  interests by  keeping  co-operatives  on  their 
!~ocs.  Not  all producers  will  want  to be  members  of 
co-op0.catives  and  not all products  are especially 
stLit,:tble  for  large-scale co-operation.  There  should 
be  scope  for  the  work  of private merchants  to continue. 
JncJc~ed it is  important that the right environment  is 
c.t·t~ill::c~d  so  that private merchants  can  survive  and  prosper. 
11:.  :·'inc.Jn(.::ial  and  other  assistance  to  producers'  organisation:·  .. 
W~at assistance will co-operatives require  in order 
to  ~1chieve their marketing objectives  and  to realise  the~ 
mos l::  appropriate  structure?  It is  sometimes  argued  thal.:: 
nothing  can be  done  in agriculture  (in the broad  sense) 
without major  intervention from  the  State  accompanied 
by  generous  financial  incentives.  It is all too  easy 
to  think that agriculture's problems,  including  those 
1n  the  marketing  sector can be  rapidly solved  through 
liberal subsidisation.  But  proposals  for  aids  should 
be  approached  with  extreme caution.  Co-operatives  (and 
For  that matter  the  private  trade)  may  justifiably receive~ 
some  financial  assistance  as  well  as  guidance  and  advice, but if a  solid and  enduring base is to be  created, 
subsidies  should be  kept  to  a  minimum.  Furthermore 
if the  project in question contributes  to  the efficiency 
of  agricultural marketing,  if its life expectancy is of 
a  reasonable  duration,  and if satisfactory assurances 
as  to its viability are  forthcoming,  then  any  financial 
aids  should in principle be  available  to participants 
whether  they can reasonably be  defined  as  farmers  or 
farmers'  organisations,  or lie outside this  definition. 
It must  anyway  be  recognised that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to make  satisfactory clear-cut 
definitions of this kind. 
Starting-up grants  and assistance  to capital projects, 
preferably through credit rate subsidisation,  are 
acceptable ·methods  of aiding co-operatives,  provided 
their level is pitched so  that these  aids  act merely  as 
an  incentive  and  a  means  of  drawing  attention·to the 
type  of organisation  and  investment  which  is likely to 
be  appropriate  to  the  development of agricultural marketincJ. 
Naturally all subsidisation results  in economic  distor~ion. 
In  addition there is  the  disadvantage  in starting-up 
grants  that  they encourage  the  formation  of new  organisatjuns 
rather  than the reform of existing ones.  Grant  aid  and 
other  assistance must  be  kept  as  low  as  possible,  otherwis0 
there  is  a  danger  that subsidies  are  pursued for.their  own 
sake.  Clearly aid must  only be  granted  when  there  is  a 
reasonably firm prospect that the  proposal  is viable. 
While  each  application must be  examined  on its merits, 
it would be right to  lay  down  as  a  condition that members 
should have  a  formal  contract with  the  organisation which 
would  ensure  that it could legally oblige  them  to deliver 
all or  a  stated proportion of the  products  covered by  the 
contract.  A co-operative organisation with  a  disciplined 
membership  is able,  if appropr1al:e,  to make  contracts  forward 
101 102 
on  behalf of its members.  It would not,  however,  be 
right to  limit grant  aid  to co-operatives  which  only 
make  sales  on contracts,  not least because  this  would 
unnecessarily restrict their commercial  freedom. 
The  suggestion is sometimes  made  that agricultural 
co-operatives  have  unique  financing  problems,  which 
justify the  provision to  them  of  funds  from  outside 
sources,  including  the State.  (It is generally 
argued  that if funds  are  provided,  they should be  at 
concessional rates).  The  case rests mainly  on  the  argument 
that their members,  farmers  and horticulturists,  require 
all the capital available  to  them  for  investment in their 
own  farm businesses,  and will never be  able  to release  to 
their organisatiorts  the  additional equity capital that 
they need.  This  is certainly the case in  some  areas 
of Western  Europe,  of which  Italy is one  example,  but  the 
argument  does  not  appear  to be  generally valid.  Besides 
any  overall  assistance  to co-operatives runs  counter to 
the  preferred policy that they should be  guided by 
economic  considerations  and  regarded  as  commercially 
viable organisations.  Like  other businesses,  co-operatives 
must  themselves  find  solutions  to their financing  problems. 
In  this  they will  tend  to be  assisted by  some  of  the  courses 
of action suggested earlier.  By being  seen  to  act dynamically 
on  their members'  behalf they will  stand  a  better chance 
of attracting  funds  from  their members.  By  collaborating 
with  interests outside  agriculture  they will be  able  to 
tap  fresh  sources  of finance  for  new projects.  And  by 
selling on contracts  their members'  contracted supplies 
they will  be better placed to borrow both  short  and  long 
term.  In  some  parts of  the  Community  special  sources  of 
finance  may  be  required for  producers'  organisations, 
but their need can best be  assessed on  a  national or 
regional basis. Apart  from  modest  subsidisation to help disciplined 
co-operatives  get off the  ground  and  to  aid viable 
ca.pi tal projects  there  are  three  areas  related to  vert.ic<:_j1 
integration which  could benefit substantially from  aid 
from  Community  sources.  First,  in-depth  studies of 
markets  for  the  various  agricultural  commodities  are 
constantly required to  improve  market  transparency. 
These  should be  generally available  and  therefore 
could be  used by both co-operative  and  private  interests 
in marketing.  A  major  feature  of  the  preparation of  th.Ls 
report has  been  the  revelation of  the  degree  of obscurity 
which still enshrouds  agricultural marketing  in  some 
member  countries.  Secondly,  further  attention needs 
to be  directed  towards  management  problems  involved  in 
vertical integration in agriculture,  the organisation 
of  joint ventures,  etc.  Management  courses  in these 
subjects  need  to be  further  developed.  And,  thirdly, 
funds  could be  made  available  to  subsidise  the cost 
of examination in detail of individual projects  in ttis 
field,  eligibility for  these  grants  to be  general  and 
not confined only  to  producers'  organisations,  though 
normally only  schemes  involving participation by 
producers  would  be  considered.  Much  could be  achieved 
to  the benefit of co-ordination of agricultural  marketinr_r 
through  concentration of Community  aid on  these  areas, 
and  at relatively modest cost. 
5.  The  responsibilities of producers'  organisations 
Vertical  integration in agriculture offers  producpr~' 
organisations  a  special opportunity.  They  have  the 
responsibility to ensure  that the various  integration 
urrangements,  the  use  of contracts  in marketing,  ownersl1 it• 
integration by co-operative organisations  and  joint 
ventures  with non-agricultural interests,  are  establisheu 
on  a  firm  and  fair footing.  Vertical  integration will 
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proceed  at varying rates,  influenced by  the  factors 
indicated at the  end of the  preceding chapter. 
Developments  can be  stimulated  and  guided by  the  small-
scale direct financial  aids  and other  assistance  suggested 
But essentially the responsibility for  safeguarding 
~nd promoting  farmers'  interests will rest with  producers' 
organisations,  and  the  successful  evolution of vertical 
integration arrangements  will be  determined by their 
directors  and  managers  and  by the  active participation 
of their members. VIII 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  POLICIES 
The  five  reports  from  individual  member  countries will 
contain detailed descriptions of what  has  occurred,  and 
is  now  occurring,  in the field of vertical integration in 
agriculture.  After reading  these reports  the  view  should 
be  confirmed that the  organised co-ordination of 
agricultural production with its market outlets,  the 
process  that vertical integration is designed to promote, 
is being  extended  and  is likely to be  even more  significant 
in the  future.  It also  seems  clear that this co-ordination 
will  primarily be  achieved  through  the use  of contracts, 
for  one  or  more  seasons  as  is most  appropriate  for  the 
product in question,  rather  than  through  ownership 
vertical integration or  joint ventures.  Unfortunately, 
however,  it is extremely difficult,  if not  impossible,  to 
assess  on  the basis of this evidence,  and  that from  elsewhere, 
how  rapid this development  may  be  in the  future.  Nor  is 
it possible  to  give  any  satisfactory answer,  particularly 
on  a  Community basis,  to questions  like "Is vertical 
integration proceeding  at the right speed,  in the best 
to 
possible manner  and/the benefit as  much  of farmers  as  of 
other interests directly concerned,  or  for  that matter of 
consumers  of  farm  products?" 
Questions  of this kind  are essentially unanswerable 
lacking definition of  what constitutes  the  "right speed". 
etc.  This  would  have  to  take  account of such  a  wide  range 
of factors  (in the  structure  and  location of farm  production, 
in the  level of technical proficiency of farmers,  in their 
ability to retain profits  and  propensity to reinvest,  in 
the  whole  state of the  agricultural marketing  and  food 
processing industries,  etc., etc.)  as  to  almost meaningless 
It is no  doubt  this difficulty of arriving at any  sensible 
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view regarding  the  right  speed  and  direction of vertical 
integration in agriculture  that has  been  the  cause  of 
the  absence  of formulation  of comprehensive  policies in 
member  countries  specifically directed  towards  this  sub  j ec l:. 
In  several respects  legislation in member  countries 
affects vertical integration;  for  example,  taxation 
Bpplied  to co-operatives,  the  provision of financial  and 
other  aids  to  farmers,  producers'  organisations  and  the 
food  industry,  and  legislation related to restrictive 
practices.  Likewise  in countries  outside  the  EEC  there 
is usually  a  body of legislation which  affects  the 
development  of vertical integration in agriculture.1 • 
In  some  EEC  countries  government  action has  gone  somewh~t 
fucther  and  become  more  directly rela·ted  to vertical 
integration,  for  instance  the  German  Marktstrukturgeset~ 
and  the  attempts  in France  to regulate  the  form  of 
r:ontrac ts  used  in agriculture.  But  in no  member  count  .  .1::-y 
is it possible  to point to legislation which  deals  at 
~11 comprehensively with  this  subject.  The  point is 
..,  ., 
Wf~.L.1. 
illustrated by  the  situation in Britain,  where,  as  stat:ecl 
\::;1clier,  the  Committee  of Inquiry on  Contract }'arming  is::.-;ur:d 
il~s  finding  and  recommendations  about  a  year  ago,  but 
tl1e  government  h2s  as  yet  ·taken  no  steps  to  act  on  the 
:\c~port. 
If the  British government  has  shown  uncertainty over 
what  intervention,  if any,  is required even  though it h~s 
the  advantage  of  a  special Report,  so  much  greater must 
1.  Legislation in the  United States related to 
vertical integration in agriculture is  described 
in "Profitable partnerships:  industry  and 
farmer  co-ops",  Ray  A.  Goldberg,  Harvard 
Business  Review,  March-April  1972,  p.lOS-121. inevitably be  the  uncertainty regarding  action  on  a 
Community basis.  Much  more  needs  to be  known,  not 
least about  farmers'  attitudes  and  aspirations  on  the 
subject.  Undoubtedly  the  reports  from  the  member 
countries  will  throw  some  light on it,  and  in  some 
cases  perhaps  indicate what  courses  of action are  to 
be  preferred.  But  the  authors  would certainly admit 
that their  work  is largely introductory.  There  is  a 
great deal  more  to be  learnt before  one  could confidentiy 
recommend  any  meaningful  intervention at Community  leveJ  .• 
The  tone  of this  study is  in general  sympathetic 
to  the  development  of producers'  organisations  and  to  tt1··:: 
extension of their activity in vertical integration. 
But  the  solution to  problems  in this  field is not  seen 
as  lying  in  a  full-scale backing  of co-operative 
organisations  simply  to  achieve  this objective.  A 
FAO  consultant,1 •  writing  in 1966,  commented  like this: 
"In  the  last analysis  the  problems  of vertical  integral  LUtJ 
cannot be  reduced  to  an  argument  between  the virtues 
of co-operation  and  the evils of monopolistic  society. 
It is  more  a  question of which  form,  or  combination  of 
forms,  give  the best prospect for  the  economic  developrttl:~i'i  1:: 
of  the  agricultural  industry  and  the  social well-being  of 
its workers.  It is more  than  possible ·chat  there  is  ,., 
plac~ for  all  forms  of integration depending  to  a  large 
extent  on  the  commodity,  region,  farm  type,  farmers' 
attitudes  and  the existing agrarian structure''·  This 
statement still retains its validity and it could be  acJch:;(.J 
that there  are  other interests  to  be  taken  account of 
apart  from  farmers. 
1.  Mr.  John  Higgs  in "Structural Reaction  to 
Vertical  Integration",  FAO  ECA  Working  Party 
on  Agrarian  Structure,  September,  1966. 
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Policymakers  with responsibilities  towards  agriculture 
0re  always  under  pressure  from  some  source  to  intervene  -
through  regulations,  capital grants,  cheap credit,  etc. 
And  it is highly  tempting  to  accede.  After all there  arc~ 
already  so  many  distortions  to competition in agriculture, 
it can be  argued  that one  more  could hardly  do  much  harm. 
Therefore,  the  argument  might continue,  why  not  issue 
some  regulations  concerned with vertical integration, 
grant special  subsidies  to  those  who  make  contracts, 
and  extend  financial  assistance to projects  which  constitute 
joint ventures  between  producers'  organisations  and  privale 
industry.  Thus  would  a  process  be  accelerated,  which  all 
r:1gree  has  a  valuable role  to perform,  and all interested 
porties,  including consumers,  would benefit. 
The  argument  appears  to be  attractive,  but it should 
be  resisted,  at least in the  present state of knowledge  or1 
this  suoject,  and  most  probably even if much  more  was  knowr1 
<Jbout  it.  There  is  a  good  case  for  fostering  the 
development  of producers'  organisations,  as  is  already 
._,  firm  article of Community  policy,  and  aid  should 
ccrtQinly be  confined to  those  organisations  which  can 
count  on  a  disciplined membership.  This  is likely to 
;1.-1ve  ctn  indirect effect on  producers'  participation in 
vc,_r:- t.lcal  integration.  But organisations  should not be 
forced,or  bribed by grants,  to enter into contracts  for 
che  disposal  of their members'  produce,  or hustled into 
participation in  joint ventures  through  the carrot of 
special  inducements.  The  right policy is to assist the 
developments  of well-based producers'  organisations, 
including  taking  account of their capital problems,  but 
to  avoid  trying  to tell  them  how  to run  their businesses. 
There  remain  some  unobjectionable courses of action 
which  could have  some  indirect but still important influence  on vertical integration in agriculture.  More 
needs  to be  known  about  the  workings  of  agricultural 
markets  and  the  demands  for  farm  products,  which  in  some 
cases still suffer  from  obscurity.  More  work  could  well 
be  done  to  improve  transparency,  and  to  disseminate 
information on  marketing  in  an  intelligible form.  The 
management  of co-operatives calls for  special skills  • 
.1\ssistance  in management  training is  anyway  valuable,  <'tnd 
it would  have  the  incidental effect of improving  the 
possibility of effectual  action  in vertical integration 
by producers'  organisations.  The  careful  scrutiny of 
projects  prior to their implementation needs  to  be 
encouraged,  whether  they consist in proposals by 
co-operatives  to  integrate  forwards  or constitute  studiP;_; 
of possible  joint ventures  between  producers'  organisal:i_od::; 
and  private  co~panies. 
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IX 
SUMMARY 
I)  1.  Agriculture is  one  among  many  indus  t.rie:~s 
affected by vertical integration. 
Some  of  the  economic  objectives  which 
may  be  served by integration,  notably 
securing  sources  of supply  and  marketing 
outlets,  apply generally.  Many  of  th~ 
problems  raised by vertical  integration 
are  common  to all industries. 
2.  The  main  economic  benefits to be  expected 
from vertical integration  are  lower 
operating  and  selling costs,  reduction 
in market risks,  rapid exchange  of 
technical  and  market  information,  and 
optimal  use  of managerial  resources. 
3.  Many  of  the  characteristics  peculir::cc  i~o 
agriculture  are relevant  to vertical 
integration.  These  include  difficull= i_es 
in developing  horizontal  integration, 
in promoting brand identification,  dtvi 
in disseminating  information.  Agri(:u L tu.ce 
aldo  differs  from  most  other  industr.Les 
in  the  importance  of land  as  a  factor  of 
production,  and  in  the comparatively 
recent  development  of large  scale 
marketing of graded  produce  and  of 
technical  sophistication in produc-1-.iotJ. 
The  social situation of agriculture  i~ 
also relevant to vertical  integratir.Jtl  .. (Chapter  II)  4.  In most parts of Western  Europe it is 
oply during  the last hundred years 
that agriculture  has  emerged  from  a 
relatively primitive state.  Subsistence 
farming  contains  in  a  microcosm  the 
basic features  of vertical integration. 
Business  methods  which  are  commonly 
used  in other industries  have  only 
recently been  applied to agriculture. 
5.  Purchased  farm  inputs  have  become 
increasingly significant to agriculture, 
as  have  the relationships of their 
manufacturers  to  farmer  customers. 
Animal  feed manufacturers,  at one  time 
important initiators of vertical 
integration,  are unlikely to  play  such 
a  critical role in the  future,  but 
supplies of feed  will remain  an  important 
link in many contractual  schemes. 
6.  As  specialisation and  intensification of 
production have  developed,farmers  have 
become  increasingly conscious  of markets 
for  their produce.  The  possibility of 
closer quality control has  resulted 
from  technical  advances  on  a  broad front, 
thus  permitting  farmers,  either 
individually or in groups,  to become 
more  effective partners  in contracts 
with  processors. 
7.  Intensification has  been  made  possible 
through  a  higher  level of investment per 
farm,  notably in land  improvements, 
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livestock and buildings.  The  need  to 
earn  an  adequate return on capital, 
particularly to service debt,  is  an 
important inducement  to  farmers  to 
contract both backwards  on  requirements 
and  forwards  on  farm  produce. 
8.  The  food  processing industries, 
influenced by the  demands  of food 
retailers,  require regular  supplies 
of graded produce,  preferably at known 
~rices fixed in advance.  To  satisfy 
these requirements  buyers  of  a  wide 
range  of agricultural products  are 
interested in contracting for  their 
supplies. 
(Chapter  III)  9.  Regardless  of the possibility of increased 
bargaining strength through co-operative 
marketing,  most  farmers  are  likely to 
benefit from  group activity.  Few 
farmers  have  time  or talents  to  follow 
market  developments  closely. 
10.  For  farmers  the basic  purpose  of contracting 
is to obtain higher  and  more  stable net 
incomes  over  a  period.  Contracting  ~an 
assist towards  this objective  through 
lower  input costs,  including credit, 
improved  production practices  and  increased 
average  market realisations.  The  last 
is the  least certain of the benefits of 
contracting. 
11.  Both parties to contracts can benefit 
from  greater knowledge  of the other's 
business  and its problems.  The  motives (Chapter 
which  draw  together  the contracting 
parties are very similar,  the interest 
of both  sides  increasing if the  product 
in question requires  large capital 
investments,  is specialised  (few producers 
and  few outlets),  and is costly to 
transport  and  store. 
IV)  12.  The  effect on  farmers  of ownership 
vertical integration,  a  process currently 
of limited importance  in most  EEC  member 
countries,  is clearly different from 
that of contracting,  though  the latter 
can  also  lead to  a  substantial loss of 
independence  among  farmers.  Normally 
contracts run  for  a  comparatively short 
term,  at the  end of which  they may  be 
renegotiated. 
13.  Ownership vertical integration may 
result in economies  not fully available 
in contract schemes  especially if the 
whole  scheme,  including market outlets, 
is carefully planned  from  the outset. 
Processors  can be  drawn  into ownership 
integration by  the  need  to create 
supplies  for  their plants,  and  producers 
by  the  need  to gain outlets  for  products 
on  a  more  secure  and  longer  term ba&is 
than might be  obtainable  through contracts. 
14.  Processors  (or even retailers)  may 
ifltegrate backwards  into agriculture 
through  ownership of production,  but 
the reasons  for  so  doing  are rarely 
compelling.  This  development is 
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unlikely to  be  extended,  notably 
because  most  firms  prefer  to  avoid 
capital expenditure  on  investment in 
their suppliers. 
15.  Ownership  integration forwards  by 
producers'  organisations  may  on 
occasions be  justifiable.  But  such 
cases  are  likely to be  confined to 
entry into industries buying  farm 
produce  characterised by  ologopsony, 
and  industries  in which  continuing high 
margins  can be  expected despite  the 
entry of one  or  more  newcomers.  The 
shortage of experienced management 
available in co-operatives  to run  owned 
integrated businesses,  must  provide 
some  inhibition to  this  development. 
V)  16.  Industrial companies  sometimes  form 
associations,  with or without  separ~te 
corporate identity,  to  pursue  projecls 
in which  they  are mutually interested. 
Lack  of total identity of interest 
often gives rise to difficulties in 
their operation.  These  joint ventures 
are  usually of  a  horizontal rather  than 
a  vertical nature. 
17.  In  agriculture  joint ventures  are  s l:.i l.l 
uncommon,  but  there  are  a  number  of 
examples  of  them  in vertical integrution. 
They  usually arise  when  a  function  (foL 
example,  grading  and  storing  facilit:ir~s, 
a  slaughterhouse or  a  packing  station) (Chapter 
is  jointly financed  and controlled by 
interests mutually concerned in its 
development,  and  located on either side 
of it in the  agricultural marketing chain. 
18.  Joint ventures  may create  a  closer 
relationship between producers' 
organisations  and  the  food  industries 
than normally exists through contracting. 
Greater  security of outlet and  supply 
should  therefore be  achieved.  Other 
potential  advantages  include  a  more 
effective  flow of technical  and  market 
information  to agriculture.  Through 
joint ownership  the  financing  of the 
function  may  be  facilitated,  and capital 
and credit from  outside  sources, 
including  aids  from  the  State,  may  be 
more  readily obtainable. 
VI)  19.  In  the  new  EEC  member  countries vertical 
integration is most  prevalent in Denmark, 
where  the  process is very largely 
controlled by  the co-operatives.  Few 
developments  in this field have  yet 
occurred in Ireland.  Contracts  are 
used fairly extensively for  some 
products  in British agriculture; 
ownership vertical integration is 
prevalent in the poultry industry  and 
examples. can be  found  in other activities, 
notably pig production. 
20.  The  detailed studies  on vertical 
integration in the  founder  member 
countries of the  Community  will  show  that 
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integration arrangements  are  most  common 
in the broiler industry.  A  significant 
proportion of the  production of both  f:<Jgs 
and  pigmeat is affected by integration. 
A  number  of the  more  specialised products, 
including quality grains,  some  fruits 
and vegetables  and  veal calves  are  al~·;o 
important subjects  of vertical integrdtion. 
21.  Causes  of variations  in the extent of  the 
penetration of vertical integration 
between regions  of the  Community  include 
the  differing levels of technical 
competence  in agriculture,  differences 
in the structure of  food retailing  and 
in the  demands  of  the  food  processing 
industries,  and  the comparative 
significance of agricultural  products 
particularly suitable to  integration 
arrangements  in relation to  total 
agricultural production.  At  least 
equally important  are  ulfferences  ln 
the  organisation  and  competence  of 
producers'  organisations  in the  CommunLty. 
(Chapter  VII)  22.  The  requirements  of modern  large-scale 
marketing create problems  for  co-opeLatives 
in retaining effective contacts  with 
their members  and  avoiding  a  sense  of 
isolation from  decisions related to  tlH:.= 
marketing  of their products.  In theic 
promotion of vertical integration it is 
essential that producers'  organisations 
should manifestly operate  in the  general 
interests of their members.  On  the other hand  they cannot be  expected  to 
serve equally the interests of each 
individual  member  since  not all farmers 
will be  able  to  adapt their production 
to market requirements. 
23.  Opportunities exist  fot  co-operatives 
in the  EEC  to  introduce greater  income 
security for  their members  through 
promoting contract production,  organisin.g 
vertical integration under  their ownership, 
and  participating in joint ventures. 
These  developments  may yield benefits  to 
producers  through higher  market realisations, 
but for  the  main  agricultural  products 
stability of  income  is likely to be  a 
more  realisable objective. 
24.  For  some  farm  products it may  be 
impractical  to  attempt  to obtain 
Community-wide  horizontal marketing 
strength through  channelling  produce 
through  a  small  number  of producer-
controlled bottlenecks.  In such  cases 
countervailing  power  may best be 
achieved  through  the  development  of 
bargaining  associations  comparable  to 
those established in the  United States. 
(Chapter  VIII)  25.  At  present legislation in  the  EEC 
member  countries related to vertical 
integration in agriculture  tends  to  be 
indirect in its effects rather  than 
being specifically concerned with  b1.is 
subject.  In view of the  large  amount 
of uncertainty that exists  on  this 
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subject it is understandable  that 
governments  have  been reluctant to 
formulate  comprehensive  policies. 
26.  Financial  assistance  from  Community  or 
national  funds  should normally be 
confined to  producers'  organisations 
which  can  count  on  a  disciplined member-
ship.  The  policy objective  should be 
to build up  properly based organisations 
with  adequate  access  to capital,  but to 
avoid  putting  them  into  a  commercial 
strait-jacket by  imposing  special 
limitations  on  their freedom  of action. 
27.  Otherwise  aids  for  the  improvement  of 
agricultural marketing  through contracting 
and  the  formation  of joint ventures 
should be  concentrated on  subsidisation 
of  (i)  studies  designed  to  improve 
market  transparency,  (ii)  management 
training,  (iii) detailed examination 
of projects  in this  field prior  to their 
implementation.  Aids  of this kind 
could be  expected to yield indirect 
benefits  to  the  sound  development  of 
vertical integration in agriculture. 1
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